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Mass Incarceration at Sentencing
ANNE

R. TRAUM*

Courts can address the problem of mass incarceration at sentencing. Although some
scholars suggest that the most effective response may be through policy and legislative
reform, judicial consideration of mass incarcerationat sentencing would provide an
additional response that can largely be implemented without wholesale reform. Mass
incarcerationpresents a difficult problem for courts because it is a systemic problem that
harms people on several scales-individual,family, and community-and the power of
courts to address such broad harm is limited. This Article proposes that judges should
consider mass incarceration, a systemic problem, in individual criminal cases at
sentencing. Sentencing is well suited to this purpose because it is a routine phase of a
criminal case when courts have great flexibility to individualize punishment based on
individual and systemic factors. In this phase, judicial discretion is at its highest, the
judges' contact with defendants is most direct, and the court can consider the broadest
information relevant to sentencing options and impacts. Mass incarceration can be
viewed as a systemic concern that is relevant to both the defendant's history and the
traditionalsentencing purposes-includingthe need to benefit public safety and to ensure
that sentences are fair and just. Information about mass incarcerationwould enhance
courts' understandingof the impacts of sentencing on the defendant and others in the
local community. This Article articulates how this can be accomplished in federal
sentencing and suggests doctrinal and practice changes that would enhance courts'
capacity to considerand mitigate the harms of mass incarcerationin individual cases.

* Associate Professor, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Dean
John Valery White provided financial support for this project. I am grateful for comments and
encouragement from Richard Frase, Gabriel J. Chin, Christopher Blakesley, Kate Kruse, Sharon
Dolovich, Shima Baradaran, Bret Birdsong, Cara H. Drinan, Laura Appleman, Giovanna Shay, and
participants in the ABA-AALS Criminal Justice Section Academic Workshop on "Reducing Reliance
on Incarceration."
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INTRODUCTION

What can courts do to redress mass incarceration? The term mass
incarceration refers to high incarceration rates concentrated within
disadvantaged communities, and its harms include the destabilizing
impacts of imprisonment on the inmate, his family, and his community
during and after the prison term. Scholarly attention on mass
incarceration has focused on its causes and impacts, as well as on policy
reforms intended to slow or reverse the trend. Few have articulated the
aim of this Article: a pathway for redressing mass incarceration in the
courts within a criminal case.' Situating mass incarceration analysis as a
concern within a criminal case may not achieve what legislative reform
could do, but it offers an approach for courts to redress mass incarceration
under existing legal structures.
This Article argues that courts have the authority to consider the
harms of mass incarceration at criminal sentencing under existing law
and proposes measures to enhance court capacity to recognize and
minimize those harms. Courts are on the front line of deciding who goes
to prison and for how long, and they routinely tailor punishment based
on individualized factors and systemic concerns, including fairness and
public safety. Mass incarceration harms are relevant to the defendants'
history and the systemic purposes of sentencing, including whether the
sentence will enhance public safety and foster respect for the law.
Incorporating analysis of mass incarceration harms analysis at sentencing
would build on courts' sentencing expertise and add an important
dimension to the sentencing justification. With proper information and
guidance, courts could tailor sentences with an eye toward decreasing the
harms of mass incarceration.
Part I describes some of the causes and harms of mass incarceration.
The criminal justice system has in the past three decades increasingly
relied on incarceration as a form of punishment, resulting in many more
people going to prison or jail and serving longer sentences. The harms of
mass incarceration occur at the individual, family, and community levels,
and they extend into the future after release from prison. By
understanding these harms, courts may consider them when sentencing
an individual defendant. Part II argues that sentencing is the best time
for courts to redress mass incarceration. All courts, state and federal,
balance individual and systemic factors when tailoring a sentence to an
individual defendant and routinely consider the four major purposes of
sentencing (retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation), as
well as proportionality. Part II argues that this traditional analysis can
include mass incarceration impacts and that courts can individually tailor
i. See, e.g., Cecelia Klingele, Changing the Sentence Without Hiding the Truth: Judicial Sentence
Modificationas a Promising Method of Early Release, 52 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 465 (2010).
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sentences to eliminate or mitigate such harms. This Part focuses on
federal sentencing, which represents a small fraction of all criminal cases,
but the analytical approach is broadly applicable to any sentence in
which a court exercises discretion.! Part III discusses both how courts can
consider mass incarceration impacts in federal sentencing and the judicial
reforms that would aid this project.
I. MASS INCARCERATION AND ITS HARMS
Mass incarceration is a product of our criminal justice system, yet our
criminal adjudication process is awkwardly suited to redress the problem.
The phenomenon is chronicled in a range of academic scholarship in law,'
political science,' economics,' and sociology.6 Awareness of these issues
has been raised by media reports on the high rates of incarceration (i in
oo men, or 2.3 million people, are in jail or prison), the release of
prisoners due to overcrowding,' and the lengths of prison terms.' This
Part aims to identify some key features of this societal problem with an
eye toward how it might be addressed by courts.
In its most generic form, the term "mass incarceration" typically is
used to describe both the trend toward historically high incarceration
rates in the United States and the causes and effects of that trend. David
Garland is credited with coining the term "mass imprisonment," which
2. Federal cases comprise only a fraction of all criminal cases. See Kevin R. Reitz, Demographic
Impact Statements, O'Connor'sWarning, and the Mysteries of Prison Release: Topics from a Sentencing
Reform Agenda, 61 FLA. L. REV. 683, 684-85 (2oo9) (observing that 95% of criminal cases arise and
are sentenced in state courtrooms). In most federal cases, courts enjoy considerable discretion at
sentencing despite the prevalence of statutory minimum sentences. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,
OVERVIEW

OF STATUTORY

MANDATORY

MINIMUM

SENTENCING

I (2oo8)

[hereinafter

MANDATORY

MINIMUM]. In 2008, 28.6% of federal defendants were convicted under a mandatory minimum statute,
meaning that in over 70% of cases the court's discretion at sentencing was not constrained by a
mandatory minimum statute. Id.
3. See generally David Cole, Turning the Corner on Mass Incarceration?,9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
LAW 27 (2o I); Andrew E. Taslitz, The CriminalRepublic: Democratic Breakdown as a Cause of Mass
Incarceration,9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. LAW 133 (2011).
4. See generally VANESSA BARKER, THE POLITICS OF IMPRISONMENT: HOW THE DEMOCRATIC
PROCESs SHAPES THE WAY AMERICA PUNISHEs OFFENDERS (2009); LISA L. MILLER, THE PERILS OF
FEDERALISM: RACE, POVERTY AND THE POLITICS OF CRIME CONTROL (2008).
5. See, e.g., Do PRISONS MAKE US SAFER? THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE PRISON BooM,

(Stephen Raphael & Michael Stoll eds., 2009); Glenn C. Loury, Crime, Inequality & Social Justice,
DAEDALUS, Summer 20oo, at 134-40.

6. See Bruce Western & Christopher Wildeman, Punishment, Inequality and the Future of Mass
Incarceration, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 851, 857-66 (2ooo). See generally Robert J. Sampson & Charles
Loeffler, Punishment's Place: The Local Concentration of Mass Incarceration, 139 DAEDALUS 20 (2010);

Christopher Wildeman, Imprisonment and (Inequality in) Population Health, 41 Soc. Sci. REs. 74 (2012).
7. Adam Liptak, More Than i in too Adults Are Now in Prison in U.S.: Inmate Population Is
Highest in the World, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2oo8, at A14.
8. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011); see also Adam Liptak, Justices, 5-4, Tell
California to Cut Prisoner Population, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2011, at Ai.

9. See Solomon Moore, Study Finds Record Number of Inmates Serving Life, N.Y. TIMES, July
23, 2009, at A24.
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he defined as having two distinct characteristics: (i) unusually and
historically high imprisonment rates, and (2) heavy concentration on
certain demographic groups.'o As Garland describes, "[m]ass imprisonment
implies a rate of imprisonment... that is markedly above the historical
and comparative norm for societies of this type,"" and "it ceases to be
the incarceration of individual offenders and becomes the systemic
imprisonment of whole groups of the population."" This definition
identifies mass incarceration as a group and systemic problem, not
merely an individual problem.
The term "mass incarceration" has sparked academic debate. But
even the critiques highlight the serious, systemic, and community nature
of its impacts. Professors Robert Weisberg and Joan Petersilia suggest that
the term is "melodramatic" because it carries connotations of
governmental conspiracy and suggests the existence of an "epidemic" or
self-generating phenomenon beyond our control." Yet they recognize that
mass incarceration has led to a "structural change in our social, economic,
and familial life." 4 Professor Loic Wacquant argues that "mass
incarceration" wrongly implies a problem affecting the masses, that is, that
it affects large swaths of citizenry, across social and physical space, in
broad and indiscriminate ways." To the contrary, Wacquant argues,
incarceration growth rates have "been finely targeted," by class, race,
and geography. 6 This concentration has led to the "hyperincarceration"
of disadvantaged urban black men, while leaving the rest of society
relatively untouched." These critiques underscore some salient features of
mass incarceration: It is a systemic problem stemming from the cumulative
societal impacts of individual imprisonment, these impacts are significant,
and they (along with high incarceration rates) are concentrated in certain
disadvantaged communities.
A.

IMPRISONMENT GROWTH AND ITS CAUSES

Growth in incarceration rates is commonly traced to a range of legal
policies, which have increased both the likelihood of imprisonment and
10. See David Garland, Introduction: The Meaning of Mass Imprisonment, in MASS
IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES I, 1-2 (David Garland ed., 2oo).
It. Id. at i.
12. Id. at 2.

13. Robert Weisberg & Joan Petersilia, The Dangers of Pyrrhic Victories Against Mass
Incarceration,139 DAEDALUS 124, 124 (2010).
14. Id.; see also id. at 131 (arguing that the problem stems more mundanely from the accumulation
of misguided policies, and may be redressed by focusing on reducing "unnecessary incarceration," for
example, by developing a "what works" literature on prison alternatives to guide sentencing).

15. Lofc wacquant, Class, Race & Hyperincarcerationin Revanchist America, 139 DAEDALUS 74,
78 (2010); see Sampson & Loeffler, supra note 6, at 25 ("[Tjhe concept of 'mass' incarceration is
potentially quite misleading, for its instantiation is experienced at highly local level.").

16. Wacquandt, supra note 15, at 74, 78.
17. Id. at 78.
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the lengths of prison terms. Professors Todd Clear and James Austin
have described "the iron law of prison populations" as the result of two
factors-how many people go to prison and how long they stay." Which
factor is the more important is open to debate: Some contend it is prison
admissions,o while others argue that the number of long sentences make
U.S. prison rates unique."' It is clear, however, that a reduction in
incarceration rates requires fewer prison admissions, shorter prison
terms, or both."
The scale of the prison system is usually measured by the
incarceration rate. The per day incarceration rate measures the number
of people in prison per day per 0oo,ooo of the population.2 3 The United
States now has the highest incarceration rate in the world, peaking at
over 750 persons incarcerated per ioo,ooo, roughly seven times the rate
in Western Europe.24 Though recent budgetary constraints have caused
incarceration rates to dip in most states, the federal rate of incarceration
has continued to grow, and the numbers overall remain high." But the
daily incarceration rate tells only part of the story. It neither fully
captures the duration of sentences nor reflects the toll of those sentences
on defendants and persons not in the system.2"
The causes of this explosive growth, though debated, are generally
identified as several legal developments over the past four decades that
have resulted in more prison sentences and longer terms. Beginning in
18. Todd R. Clear & James Austin, Reducing Mass Incarceration: Implications of the Iron Law of
Prison Populations, 3 HARv. L. &POL'Y REV. 307, 312 (2009).
19. Id. For statistics on how many and how long, see Keith Reitz, Don't Blame Determinacy: U.S.
Incarceration Rates Have Been Driven by Other Forces, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1787, 1787 (2o6).
20. Wacquant, supra note 15, at 75.
21. See Reitz, supra note 19, at 1788 ("[T]he essential attribute . .. is in its duration ....
); Adam

Liptak, Inmate Count in U.S. Dwarfs Other Nations', N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2oo8, at Ai (explaining that
"the mere number of sentences imposed here would not place the United States at the top of the
incarceration lists.... [because] annual admissions to prison per capita[] [in] in several European
countries [are higher]," but rather, it is the duration of American prison stays that make our total
incarceration rate higher).
22. Clear & Austin, supra note i8, at 312.
23. Western & Wildeman, supra note 6, at 857.
24. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FACTS ABOUT PRISONS AND PRISONERS, THE SENTENCING
PROJECT (July 2008), available at http://www.ala.orglala/aboutalaloffices/olos/prison-facts.pdf; see also
ASHLEY NELLIS & RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT,
SENTENCES IN AMERICA (July 2009).

No Exrr:

THE EXPANDING USE OF LIFE

25. Cole, supra note 3, at 27; Marie Gottschalk, Cell Blocks & Red Ink: Mass Incarceration, The
Great Recession & Penal Reform, 139 DAEDALUS 62, 62 (2oo) (stating that while the prison population
in 20o8 and 2oo9 edged downward in twenty-seven states, it grew in twenty-three states, and the
federal prison population increased by 7%).
26. Reitz, supra note 19. at 1788. Highlighting sentence duration, Professor Keith Reitz has
charted prison growth in "person-years." Id. In Reitz's chart, a comparison of per day incarceration
snapshots showed an increase of 744,413 inmates from 1990 to 1999. Id. at 1788-89. In person-years,

this growth was even more dramatic. Id. Assuming no growth in incarceration, the system would have
dispensed I1.5 million person-years of confinement, but it actually dispensed 15.3 million person-years
of incarceration-a 5o% increase in lost liberty. Id. at 1789.
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the 1970s, there was an increase in the commitment of "marginal felons" to
jail and prison for low-level felonies like drunk driving, drug possession,
and parole violations." Incarceration, rather than rehabilitation, became
the preferred sanction." The war on drugs, beginning in the 198os, vastly
expanded drug crime prosecutions and made prison sentences for drug
offenses routine." From 1980 to 2007, there was a roughly twenty-fold
increase in the number of federal offenders imprisoned for drug
offenses-from 4900 in 19803o to 98,675 in 2oo7."' During the same

period, the number of arrests for sale and manufacture of drugs more
than doubled." Drug offenders began to receive longer sentences than
before.33 State and federal laws created stiff mandatory minimum
sentences for many drug offenses.34
New repeat offender statutes and "truth in sentencing" laws also
resulted in longer prison sentences." Laws like California's Three Strikes
and You're Out resulted in severe penalties, often mandatory, for repeat

27. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT 90 (1991) (noting
that imprisonment is now viewed "as an appropriate punishment for all types of offense"). Cf
Franklin E. Zimring, Imprisonment Rates and the New Politics of Criminal Punishment, in MASS
IMPRISONMENT, supra note To, at 145, 145-46 (describing three distinct phases of prison growth: first,
the period from 1973 to the mid-1980s, when "the emphasis was on general increases in the
commitment of marginal felons to prison"; second, the period from 1985 to 1992, when the emphasis
switched to drugs; and finally, the period from 1992 onward, when imprisonment rates continued to
grow very substantially despite rapidly decreasing crime rates).
28. See J. Nancy Gertner, Supporting Advisory Guidelines, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 261, 261-62
(2oo9); see also Marc Mauer, Why Are Tough on Crime Policies so Popular?, II STAN. L. & POL'Y REV.
9, is (i999) ("[E]very state and the federal government has some kind of mandatory sentencing law.").
29. See Sentencing Memorandum of Myles Haynes at 9, United States v. Haynes, 557 F. Supp. 2d
200 (D. Mass. 2008) (No. 06-io328-NG), 2oo6 WL 5283198.
30. RYAN S. KING & MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECr, A 25-YEAR QUAGMIRE: THE WAR ON
DRUGS AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICAN SOCIETY 9 (2007).
31. See Sentencing Memorandum of Myles Haynes, supra note 29, at so.
32. Id. (noting that drug arrests jumped from 137,900 arrests in 1982 to 337,900 arrests in 2005).

33. Today in the federal system the average drug offender sentence is nearly twice as long as in
1983. Compare MARGARET W. CAHALAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ
102529, HISTORICAL CORRECTIONs STATISTICS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1850-1984 162-63 (1986) (in 1983, a
federal drug offender served on average forty-four months in prison), with U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTIcs, NCJ 231822, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2008-STATISTICAL TABLES, tbl.5.2 (2010),
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=I745 [hereinafter 2oo8 FEDERAL JUSTICE
STATISTIcs] (in 2007, a federal drug offender served on average eighty-five months in prison).
34. Marc Mauer, The Causes and Consequences of Prison Growth in the United States, in MASS
IMPRISONMENT, supra note to, at 4, 6 (citing a record 1.6 million drug arrests in 1998, and noting the
mandatory prison sentences at the federal and state levels, including the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986
and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, which imposed a five-year mandatory minimum sentence for
possession of as little as five grams of crack cocaine, and Michigan's "Public Act 368 of 1978," which
imposed a mandatory life without parole sentence, even for first time offenders, for the sale of 650
grams of heroin or cocaine).
35. Marc L. Miller, Domination and Dissatisfaction:Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REV.
1211, 1223 (2004) (considering the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984). In fact, probation has been nearly
eliminated as a sentence. Id. at 1212; Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum:Judges, Prosecutors,and the
Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L. J. 1420, 1453 (2008).

HeinOnline -- 64 Hastings L.J. 429 2012-2013

43o0

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:423

offenders."' Some attribute the increase of incarceration and lengthening
of prison terms to "truth in sentencing" laws, such as the federal
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which aimed to increase uniformity in
sentencing but in doing so resulted in more prison sentences and longer
prison terms.37 These evolutions in sentencing law and practice
dramatically impacted who went to prison and the length of prison terms.
As discussed in Part II, these changes also transformed the judicial role
in sentencing.
These changes have increased both the number of people going to
jail or prison and the number serving long and extremely long terms.
Today, the average felony prison sentence is over four years, and only
28% of felons avoid jail or prison time." At the high end, there has been
a dramatic increase in the number of prisoners serving sentences of life
or life without parole.40 Beyond prison walls, the correctional system also
includes nearly five million people under parole or probation,' both of
which often function as a pathway to or back to prison.42

36. ZIMRING &HAWKINS, supra note 27, at 147; see also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. II, 15 (2003)

("Between 1993 and 1995, 24 States and the Federal Government enacted three strikes laws.").
37. See KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN FEDERAL
COURTS 5 (1998) ("Before the Guidelines, 50 percent of all federal defendants received
nonimprisonment sentences; in the last decade, that percentage has dropped to less than 15 percent.").

38. The per day incarceration rate jumped from 133 per too,ooo in 1980 to 387 per soo,ooo in
1994, and then to 762 per loo,ooo in 2008. CAHALAN, supra note 33, at 29; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, The Nation's Prison Population Grew Almost 9 Percent Last Year (Aug. 9, 1995),
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/press/PI94.PR; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 24. In
the early 1980s, most state felony offenders served, on average, sixteen to seventeen months before
release. CAHALAN, supra note 33, at 54 tbl-3-24. In 2oo6, the average felony sentence in state court
exceeded four years. THOMAS H. COHEN & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 228944, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2oo6 13 (2010); see
also ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 27, at 120 fig-5.J; Bruce Western & Christopher Wildeman, The
Black Family and Mass Incarceration, 621 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 221, 225 (2009)
("Because the system of criminal sentencing had come to rely so heavily on incarceration, an arrest in
the late 1990s was far more likely to lead to prison time than at the beginning of the prison boom in
1980."). See generally PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, PRISON COUNT 2010: STATE POPULATION DECLINES
FOR THE FIRST TIME IN 38 YEARS (2010).
39. See COHEN & KYCKELHAHN, supra note 38, at 13. The average sentence for violent felonies is
ninety-four months. Id.
40. Nationally, as of 2009, one in eleven prisoners is serving a life sentence; in California, the rate
is one in five prisoners. NELLIS & KING, supra note 24, at 3. The number of prisoners serving life
sentences has quadrupled since 1984. Id. at 7. Twenty-nine percent of those serving life sentences are
serving life without the possibility of parole. Id. at 3. The number of life without parole sentences
climbed 22% in the past five years. Id.
41. Western & Wildeman, supra note 15, at 858-59. This brings the total number of persons under
correctional supervision to more than 7.1 million, or about 3.1% of all adults in the United States. Id.
at 859.
42. For decades, California required supervision of all released inmates and mandated prison
sentences for even minor parole violations, swelling prisons with relatively low-risk offenders. See
Robert Rogers, Parole Violations Feed Prison's Revolving Door, THE BAY CITIZEN (Aug. 1o, 2010),
http://www.baycitizen.org/crime/storyllook-prisons-revolving-door. A recent change in law in January
2011 permits focus on more serious parole violations. See Sara Mayeux, "Prison Without Walls" and the
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Though alarming, none of these metrics adequately captures the
dynamic impact of imprisonment on inmates and others outside the
criminal justice system.
B.

THE BROADER HARMS OF MASS INCARCERATION

Understanding how mass incarceration fits within the sentencing
picture requires consideration of its harms, that is, whom it impacts and
how. A growing body of literature is beginning to quantify the human toll
of mass incarceration. At least two salient harms of mass incarceration
warrant special concern: It harms persons both in the system and outside it
(inmates and non-inmates), and it disproportionately impacts
disadvantaged communities without making them safer.43 The harm of
mass incarceration starts at the individual level and then reverberates to
the family" and the community.45 Certain factors of disadvantage predict
who is more at risk of going to prison and who will be impacted by a
prison sentence.46 Disadvantaged communities disproportionately bear
the brunt of high incarceration rates by enduring the strain and
destabilization caused by the absence and return of prisoners.47 There is
evidence that incarceration-even short-term incarceration-causes
lasting harms.4" Courts have reason to be concerned about such harms
during the sentencing process.
I.
Individual Impacts
At the individual level, a prison sentence, even a short one, can have
lasting detrimental effects that may not be accounted for in the
sentencing process. The prison sentence and subsequent supervision
restrictions are hardships that are expressly contemplated at sentencing.
After completing his sentence, the individual may face additional civil

Special Case of California, PRISON LAW BLOG, (Aug. 16, 20oo, 6:53 PM), http://prisonlaw.wordpress.com/

201o/o8/i6/prison-without-walls-and-the-special-case-of-california.
43. Western & Wildeman, supra note 38, at 233-39 (noting the effects on families and
communities, along with the possibility of producing a more violent post-incarceration individual).
44. See Marc Mauer, Thinking About Prison and Its Impact in the Twenty-First Century, 2 Omo
ST. J. CRIM. L. 607, 611-12 (2005).

45. See Weisberg & Petersilia, supra note 13, at 131. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and
Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1276,

1281-85 (2004); Jeffrey Fagan & Valerie West, Incarceration and the Economic Fortunes of Urban
Neighborhoods 6-9 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Grp., Paper No.
11-266, 2oo), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1772I9O. See generally Todd R. Clear et al.,

Coercive Mobility and Crime: A Preliminary Examination of Concentrated Incarceration and Social
Disorganization, 20 JUST. Q. 33 (2oo3) (further investigating this phenomenon).
46. See Western & Wildeman, supra note 15, at 857-66. See generally BRUCE

WESTERN,

PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 11-33 (2oo6).

47. Western & Wildeman, supra note 38, at 230 (describing how the stigma of a prison record
creates legal barriers and how former prisoners are less likely to get married).
48. See Sampson & Loeffler, supra note 15, at 29; Fagan & West, supra note 45, at 6-9.
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consequences that are not always expressly mentioned in the criminal
case. Convicted felons, for example, routinely suffer significant civil
consequences as a result of conviction: Felons often cannot vote or serve
on a jury, are disqualified from receiving welfare benefits and federal
educational assistance, and may no longer qualify for certain jobs or
licensed occupations.49
For many disadvantaged individuals, especially young black men,
prison has become a "regular, predictable part of experience, rather than
a rare and infrequent event.""o Inmates are mostly black or Latino,"'
young,52 less educated, and underemployed." For many, the risk of going
to prison has become an ordinary aspect of life:54 One in eight black men
in their twenties is in prison or jail on any given day," and 69% of black
high school dropouts are imprisoned over their lifetime,56 compared with
just 15% for white high school dropouts." These racial disparities reflect
a historic shift from a time when 70% of prisoners were white," and these
disparities increase with the severity of the punishment.59
Imprisonment, with its collateral consequences, is a "turning point"
in the lives of these young men because it has lasting political, economic,
and social detrimental consequences. Positive life events, such as marriage,
military service, high school graduation, and college," are associated with
the process of becoming an adult and leading a stable life, 6 ' and they serve
as important markers of a non-criminal lifestyle. Prison is not only a

49. See Mauer,supra note 44, at 61o; Western & Wildeman, supra note 38, at 230.
50. MASS IMPRISONMENT, supra note to, at 2; see Western & Wildeman, supra note 38, at 231

(noting that for young black men imprisonment is a "routine life event" on the pathway to adulthood).
51. Racial Disparity, THE

SENTENCING

PROJEcT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/template/

page.cfm?id=122 (last visited Dec. 7, 2012). See PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 201677, PRISONERS IN 2004, at 8 (2oo5) (reporting that in

2004, one in three black adult men thirty-five years or younger were in the "system," that is, either in

prison or jail or under correctional supervision).
52. Western & Wildeman, supra note 38, at 228 (noting that about two-thirds of adult state
prisoners are thirty-five years of age or younger).
53. Id.
54. Adam Gopnik, The Cagingof America, NEW YORKER, Jan. 30, 2012, at 72.

55. Western & Wildeman, supra note 38, at 228 (statistics as of 2004). Racial disparities in prison
rates are unmatched by other metrics like unemployment, infant mortality, and wealth. Id.
56. This figure is five times the rate for that group fifty years ago. Id.
57. For black men who finished high school without further schooling, the lifetime risk of
imprisonment is I8%. Id.
58. Loic Wacquant, Deadly Symbiosis: When Ghetto and Prison Meet and Mesh, in MASS
IMPRISONMENT, supra note lo, at 82, 82.
59. NELLIS & KING, supra note 24, at 14 ("African-Americans comprise 12% of the general

population but represent 28% of total arrests and 38% of persons convicted of a felony in a state
court."). Two-thirds of people with life sentences are non-white, and nearly half are AfricanAmerican, while 77% of juveniles sentenced to life are non-white. Id. at 3, 11, 12 tbl.3.
60. Western & Wildeman, supra note 38, at 231-33.
61. Id. at 229.

62. Id.
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defining experience, but it diminishes the likelihood of stabilizing life
events later on.63
For individuals, prison is destabilizing long after the sentence ends.
Importantly, these lasting harms are not limited to the inmate sentenced,
but extend to others. These "secondary effects" of incarceration have
amounted to a "structural change in our social, economic, and familial

life."64
Family Impacts
Because most prisoners are parents,6 prison is detrimental to families
and children.66 Children of inmates are at higher risk of future
2.

incarceration.67 Incarceration isolates parents from their children, removes

financial and caregiving support for the children, and imposes on the
family the cost, time, and stress of maintaining a relationship with an
incarcerated parent.68 The non-inmate parent may have less money and
less time to invest in the children, and older children may shoulder
greater responsibilities by having to care for siblings or get a job.69 These
forces result in lower educational achievement for the children, which, in
turn, may increase their own risk of incarceration."o Children and spouses
also may experience the stigma of prison even more intensely than the
prisoner." The parent's return from prison may only partially relieve the
harm to the child, as inmates return with diminished earning power and
social status, and increased strain."
63. See Brett C. Burkhardt, Criminal Punishment, Labor Market Outcomes, and Economic
Inequality: Devah Pager'sMarked: Race, Crime, and Finding Work in an Era of Mass Incarceration,
34 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1039, 1043-45 (2oo9) (noting that employment opportunities for former
prisoners, especially black former prisoners, are bleak); Western & Wildeman, supra note 38, at 230;
id. at 234 (noting that marriage rates among prisoners and former prisoners are low); id. at 233-36
(noting that former prisoners are less likely to marry or cohabit with the mothers of their children); id.
at 237 (noting that incarceration strains couples and families during and after prison).
64. Weisberg & Petersilia, supra note 13, at 124.
65. See Holly Foster & John Hagan, The Mass Incarceration of Parents in America: Issues of
Race/Ethnicity, CollateralDamage to Children, and PrisonerReentry, 623 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
Soc. ScI. 179, 181 (2009); Western & Wildeman, supra note 38, at 236 (noting that about half of fathers
and two-thirds of mothers were living with their children when they were sent to prison, and that even
those not living with their children may have contributed valuable caregiving and/or financial support
before going to prison).
66. See Roberts, supra note 45, at 1282.
67. Cf Western & Wildeman, supra note 38, at 241 ("If the children of the prison boom ... are
more involved in crime themselves, they too will risk following their parents into prison.").
68. Roberts, supra note 45, at 1282; Western & Wildeman, supra note 38, at 240.
69. Foster & Hagan, supra note 65, at 183.
70. Id. at 184.
71. Western & Wildeman, supra note 38, at 238. See generally Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares,
Punishment, Deterrence and Social Control: The Paradox of Punishment in Minority Communities,
6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 173 (2008).
72. See Dina R. Rose & Todd R. Clear, Incarceration, Reentry, and Social Capital: Social
Networks in the Balance, in PRISONERS ONCE REMOVED: THE IMPACT OF INCARCERATION AND REENTRY
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Finally, black families disproportionately bear the brunt of these
impacts. Black children are nearly eight times more likely than white
children to have a father in prison. As Western and Wildeman note,
"[j]ust as incarceration has become a normal life event for disadvantaged
young black men, parental incarceration has become commonplace for

their children." 74
Community Impacts
3.
Communities with high incarceration rates disproportionately bear
the brunt of incarceration but are not necessarily safer. Paradoxically,
more incarceration does not make neighborhoods safer, and it may lead to
higher crime and higher incarceration. Some may argue that removing
"bad seeds" from the community is beneficial to the family and
community." But this calculus is different if removal of the person will
harm the community more than help it.77 Sociological studies show that,
because high incarceration rates are geographically concentrated in
disadvantaged communities, those communities are harmed when
prisoners are incarcerated and when they return with diminished political,
economic, and social status.7" These studies counter the common wisdom
that locking up criminals is beneficial to crime-ridden communities.
Mass imprisonment may be counterproductive if it harms
communities in ways that ultimately sustain crime and poverty. 79 High

ON CHILDREN, FAMILIES, AND COMMUNITIES 313, 324-26, 334-35 (Jeremy Travis & Michelle Waul eds.,
2003).

73. Western & Wildeman, supra note 38, at 235. Nationwide in 2000, nearly 3% of all children
had a father in prison or jail. Id. For whites, the rate was 1.2%, while for blacks the rate was one in
eleven (approximately 9.1%). Id. For an African-American child, the risk of parental imprisonment
before the child is age fourteen was 25%. Id. at 236. For an African-American child whose parent
dropped out of high school, the number was twice as high, about 5o%. Id.
74. Id.
75. See generally Todd R. Clear & Dina R. Rose, Individual Sentencing Practicesand Aggregate
Social Problems, in CRIME CONTROL AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: THE DELICATE BALANCE 27 (Darnell F.
Hawkins et al. eds., 2003) (arguing incarceration only makes socially organized places safer, whereas

incarceration has the opposite effect in socially disorganized places, e.g., urban ghettos).
76. Todd R. Clear, The Problem with "Addition by Subtraction": The Prison-CrimeRelationship
in Low-Income Communities, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS
IMPRISONMENT I8I, 192-93 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) ("It seems beyond debate
that any policy that removes people who do bad things [by incarcerating them] leaves those who
remain better off...."); Clear & Rose, supra note 75, at 27-28 (explaining that some attribute

reductions in crime to the increase in incarceration); see Roberts, supranote 45, at 1286.
77. See Roberts, supra note 45, at 1283-84 (providing the examples of nonviolent first time drug
offenders, mothers, and other caregivers).
78. See Sampson & Loeffler, supra note 13, at 29 ("High levels of concentrated imprisonment ...
seem unlikely to contribute to... healthy communities."). See generally Todd R. Clear et al.,
Incarceration and Community: The Problem of Removing and Returning Offenders, 47 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 335 (2001).
79. Clear, supra note 76, at 193; Tracey L. Meares, Social Organization and Drug Law
Enforcement, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19I, 213 (1998); Roberts, supra note 43, at 1285-86.
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imprisonment rates can disrupt social order," "undermine the building
blocks of social order,"' and destabilize community life.82 Professor
Dorothy Roberts has described how mass incarceration "damages social
networks," starting at the family level and then "reverberat[ing]
throughout communities where the families of prisoners are
congregated." While one family can bear the strain of a family member's
imprisonment by relying on "networks of kin and friends," multiple
families relying on the same network eventually strain and weaken the
community." The absence of family members also means fewer people in
community groups that "enforce informal social control."' Communities
that are destabilized by high incarceration rates cannot thrive and are not
safer.
Disadvantaged communities suffer high incarceration rates in ways
that cannot be explained by crime.8 In a recent study of crime and
incarceration rates in Chicago,' Professors Robert J. Sampson and
Charles Loeffler found that high incarceration rates are geographically
concentrated in "hot spots" that are "hardly random."" Rather, these hot
spots are "systematically predicted by key social characteristics"
correlating to urban disadvantage,89 including poverty, unemployment,
family disruption (e.g., single-parent, female-headed families), and racial
isolation.' Areas with "concentrated disadvantage"-that is, where these
factors are clustered9 -correlated to higher incarceration rates but not
higher crime.9 2 Incarceration may be necessary and beneficial in some
cases, and its relationship to crime control is complex." Still, the data
suggest there may be a tipping point when incarceration becomes so
heavily concentrated in disadvantaged communities that it works against
the safety and well-being of that community.
Recognizing the full range of direct and collateral harms of
incarceration, especially as it affects communities with concentrated levels
of disadvantage, can aid courts in redressing mass incarceration. But this
8o. Roberts, supra note 45, at 1285.
81. Clear, supra note 76, at 183.
82. Id. at 193.

83. Roberts, supra note 45, at 1282.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1285 (including neighborhood associations, churches, and social clubs).
86. See Sampson & Loeffler, supra note 15, at 21.
87. Id. at 21-22 (describing how Chicago trends have mirrored national trends in crime and
incarceration).
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

21.
21, 26.
21.
26.

92. Id. at 28 ("[While crime leads to incarceration up to a point, there is much more 'input' to the
system in the way of social cues and systematic community-level or contextual effects [that account for
the inequality in incarceration rates].").
93. See id. at 22.
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information is only helpful to informing judicial decisionmaking if it is
relevant to a legal claim or decision process that courts are actually
capable of redressing. Criminal sentencing provides an opportunity for
courts to consider and analyze the harms of mass incarceration in tailoring
a sentence for an individual defendant. Though mass incarceration is a
systemic and diffuse problem, courts are uniquely situated to redress it
case by case using traditional sentencing purposes as a framework.

II.

CONCEIVING A JUDICIAL RESPONSE

Judges have great power to shape sentencing. Because courts
administer the criminal justice system, they are frontline participants to
the problem of mass incarceration and provide a location and an
opportunity to redress it. In examining whether courts have a role to play
in slowing or mitigating the harms of mass incarceration, three questions
are relevant: Do courts have the authority to intervene? Should they
intervene? And, finally, how should they intervene? In thinking about
those questions, it is helpful to recognize that there is a "mismatch"
between mass incarceration, which is a systemic problem stemming from
the aggregate impact of criminal enforcement decisions, and our case-bycase system of criminal adjudication. Recognition of this mismatch helps
to highlight those features of mass incarceration that distinguish it from
the issues typically adjudicated in criminal cases or in related civil
litigation. Understanding the mismatch helps to craft the way that
consideration of mass incarceration might fit into judicial decisionmaking.
In light of the "mismatch," this Part explores the reasons for a
judicial response to mass incarceration and proposes that criminal
sentencing presents the best opportunity for such a response. Though
civil litigation is generally better suited to redress systemic wrongs, the
absence of a cause of action for mass incarceration means that any civil
remedy can address the problem only indirectly. And while other judicial
and prosecutorial reforms within the criminal adjudication process could
ameliorate mass incarceration and its harms, many would require a
greater adjustment of existing institutional roles through legislative
reform (most obviously, perhaps, by rolling back stricter sentencing
statutes). In contrast, sentencing is a venue where mass incarceration
harms could be considered in a way that would directly impact outcomes
under existing legal doctrine. Specifically, at the sentencing phase, courts
have direct contact with the defendant and others, the flexibility to
gather and consider a wide range of information, and the discretion to
tailor a sentence based on a combination of individual and systemic
concerns. Courts can leverage traditional sentencing factors for this
purpose to gather information and individually tailor sentences in light of
real world concerns that could impact the kind, length, and severity of
the sentence.
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THE MISMATCH: REDRESSING A SYSTEMIC PROBLEM IN INDIVIDUAL
CASES

Mass incarceration is a systemic problem that does not fit neatly into
the criminal adjudication model. Our criminal justice system is focused
on moving single defendants' through the criminal process from charging
to sentencing." In that process, courts primarily focus on the adjudication
of guilt and sentencing based on individual facts, while protecting legal
rights before9 and during the court process.' Mass incarceration, by
contrast, is a widespread social problem that results from, and is
recognized as, the aggregation and concentration of many convictions and
sentences. It is the systemic manifestation of criminal adjudication and
sentences, repeated millions of times across the system.' Though mass
incarceration is the aggregate product of the criminal justice system, its
features are quite distinct from the issues adjudicated in individual
criminal cases.
In criminal adjudication, courts typically resolve individual cases,
not systemic wrongs." The facts of a criminal case, especially the nature
of the crime and the defendant's culpability, drive the charges, the plea,
and the sentence.'" Prosecutors exercise broad discretion in deciding
whether to prosecute and what charges to press,"o' negotiating a plea
94. While multiple defendants may be charged, processed, and tried together, critical aspects of
the procedure, like the adjudication of guilt and the sentencing, are individualized. See, e.g., Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 323-24 (1979) (requiring at conviction that each element be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,361 (1970) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt
as to each element for a juvenile adjudication); Boykin v. Alabama 395 U.S. 238, 242-44 (1969)
(holding that the court is charged with determining on the record that an individual guilty plea is
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963) (providing a
felony defendant the right to assistance of counsel).
95. See FED. R. CuM. P. I(a) (defining the rules applicable to federal court proceedings).
96. See U.S. CONsT. amend. IV (right against unreasonable search and seizure); U.S. CONST.
amend. V (right to due process, right against self-incrimination, right to a grand jury in federal
criminal cases).
97. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI (right to counsel, right to jury trial, right to summon and confront
witnesses); U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII (right against excessive bail and cruel and unusual punishment).
98. See Key Facts at a Glance, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICs, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/

glance/felconv.cfm (last visited Dec. 7, 2012) ("Over I million adults were convicted of a felony in state
courts in 2oo6."); see also Clear & Austin, supra note 16, at 312. See generally LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICs, NCJ 231681, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE

STATES, 2009, at 1-2 (2010) (considering the growth in population prisons experienced over the
time period studied).
99. See Brandon Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CALIF. L. REv. 383, 393 (20o7)
(describing how criminal law "lacks mechanisms to remedy systemic violations of criminal defendants'
core constitutional rights," including "the right to effective assistance of counsel, the right to have
exculpatory evidence disclosed, and the right to be free from suggestive eyewitness identifications,
coerced custodial interrogations and the fabrication of evidence").
UNITED

oo. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 116-19, 126 (1975) (holding that probable cause must

exist on each case's facts); FED. R. Clum. P. ii (stating that every guilty plea must be supported by
proper facts); accord Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 644-47 (1976).
Too. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 6o7 (1985).
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bargain,'o2 and recommending a sentence." Relief in criminal cases
usually focuses on prejudicial legal error in the adjudication of guilt'o4 or
sentencing,'" and is thus case and fact specific. If a criminal defendant is
actually guilty, admits guilt, and receives a lawful sentence, that person has
little basis in the law to complain about the result." Ninety-five percent of
criminal convictions are obtained by guilty plea." A defendant who 2 leads
guilty typically waives all non-jurisdictional claims to defect,' and
commonly waives the right to appeal.'" Thus, most defendants will not or
cannot challenge their conviction and sentence once it is final."0 Courts
have long recognized the "mutuality of advantage""' afforded by guilty
pleas as a result of plea negotiations. Defendants may benefit from a
reduced charge, lower sentence, and avoiding the uncertainty of trial."'
Prosecutors likewise gain the certainty of conviction and avoid the risk
and burden of trial."3 Courts merely enforce"' and review the lawfulness
of a guilty plea."' So long as those underlying convictions and sentences
102. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (allowing prosecutors to threaten more
serious charges if the defendant does not plead guilty, so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to
support the charges).
103. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (enforcing the prosecutor's promise
regarding sentencing recommendation as a bargained-for term of the plea agreement).
104. See 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2oo6) (error not affecting substantial rights must be disregarded); FED.
R. CRIM. P. 52(a); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995) (discovery violation prejudicial if the error
undermined confidence in the verdict); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984) (counsel
ineffective if, but for the error, it is reasonably likely the result would have been different); Chapman
v. California, 386 U.S. i8, 23-24 (1967) (harmless error analysis requires a court to balance the nature
of the error against the facts of the case in order to determine whether the error was prejudicial).
105. Appellate courts review sentences for abuse of discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.

38, 51 (2oo7).
io6. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) ("[A guilty plea] is itself a conviction;
nothing remains but to give judgment and determine punishment."). Federal rules allow a defendant
to make a conditional plea of guilty by reserving the right to appeal an adverse ruling on a pretrial
motion, such as a motion to suppress, and, if successful, withdraw the plea. FED. R. CRm. P. Ii(a)(2).
107. COHEN & KYCKELHAHN, supra note 38, at io. In 2008, 95% of federal convictions were
obtained by guilty plea. See 2oo8 FEDERAL JUSTICE STATIsTIcs, supra note 33, at tbl.4.2.

1o8. United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715,718-19 (2d Cir. 1965).
1o9. FED. R. CRIM. P. ii(b)(i)(N) specifically contemplates that defendants may waive "the right
to appeal."

Ilo. See Nancy J. King & Michael E. O'Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of Sentencing Policy,
55 DUKE L.J. 209, 212 (2005) (finding that defendants waived the right to appeal in nearly two-thirds of
plea agreements in a nationwide sample).
III. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,752 (1970).
112. Id. at 751-52.
113. Id. at 751. Prosecutors may use plea bargaining to reward a defendant for cooperation in an
investigation or at trial. See Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal Cases,45 VAND.
L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1992).

114. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (i97i) (enforcing the prosecutor's promise
regarding sentencing recommendation as a bargained-for term of the plea agreement).
115. The defendant's guilty plea must be knowing, voluntary, and supported by the facts. See
Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 644-47 (1976); Boykin v. Alabama 395 U.S. 238, 242-44 (1969).
The defendant has the right to effective assistance in entering a guilty plea, which includes
understanding the consequences of conviction. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010);
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are lawful,"'6 the aggregate impact of lawful convictions and sentences is
presumably also lawful.
The features of mass incarceration and the persons it impacts are
quite different. The harm of mass incarceration affects persons both
within the system (inmates) and outside it (their children, families, and
communities)."' Mass incarceration affects a "far broader class" than the
discrete set of criminals that are convicted and incarcerated."'8 The harms
of concentrated incarceration rates are not necessarily tethered to the
criminal law or the limited set of responses it provides, which focus on
the defendant's crime, culpability, and procedural rights."' In its very
conception, mass incarceration refers to the concentration of high rates of
incarceration of certain demographic groups, usually disadvantaged
minorities. Its harms-such as diminished social and economic status,
family disruption, political isolation and disenfranchisement, and increased
risk of criminal offending -are not issues that are suited to fruitful airing in
individual criminal cases.
Several features of mass incarceration make it difficult to redress
under existing law. These features include the aggregate nature of mass
incarceration, its impacts on third parties, the lack of a clearly recognized
legal right against mass incarceration harms, and its temporal reach. Our
criminal system is not set up to aggregate claims, even where clear legal
violations exist. 2 o Professor Brandon Garrett has described how, in
criminal law, courts rarely aggregate related legal claims in order to
redress systemic wrongs."' Instead, criminal adjudication centers on
individualized adjudication, on the premise that every defendant deserves
his "day in court."' The absence of aggregation is partially explained by
the powerful role of institutional actors in criminal law-courts,
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985).
116. Plea agreement procedures are intended to withstand appellate review and preclude collateral
review. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242-44 (stating that the voluntariness of the plea agreement cannot be
presumed from a "silent record" and requiring a record demonstrating that the defendant has a "full
understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence," to preclude "the spin-offs of
collateral proceedings that seek to probe murky memories").
117. See Donald Braman, Criminal Law and the Pursuit of Equality, 84 TEX. L. REv. 2097, 2113-14,
2II8, 2121 (2oo6) (including increased police presence and enforcement in poor urban neighborhood
communities). See generally DONALD BRAMAN, DOING TIME ON THE OUTSIDE: INCARCERATION AND
FAMILY LIFE IN URBAN AMERICA (2004) (recounting experiences of the families of prisoners); INVISIBLE

PUNISHMENT, supra note 76 (providing a collection of works covering the effects of mass imprisonment).
1I8. Braman, supra note 117, at 2121.

119.

See Darryl K. Brown, Third-PartyInterests in CriminalLaw, so TEX. L. REV. 1383, 1383 (2oo2).
12o. Garrett, supra note 99, 393-94 (stating that criminal law "lacks mechanisms to remedy
systemic violations of criminal defendants' core constitutional rights," which include the "right to
effective assistance of counsel, the right to have exculpatory evidence disclosed, and the right to be
free from suggestive eyewitness identifications, coerced custodial interrogations and the fabrication of
evidence").
121. Id. at 393.
122. Id.
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prosecutors, and public defenders, who as repeat players systemize the
handling of individual cases without aggregation procedures.' These
institutional actors influence the processing and outcomes of cases on a
systemic scale by coordinating, channeling, and settling cases one by one.12 4
Though aggregation could be useful to redress systemic wrongs-such as
for recurring constitutional violations -and to achieve institutional reform,
Professor Garrett has shown that courts rarely aggregate criminal cases.'
The systemic nature of mass incarceration presents challenges beyond
common legal claims.
Most persons harmed by mass incarceration have no related legal
claim to assert. Unlike common legal wrongs, individuals do not have a
clearly recognized legal right against mass incarceration or its harms. So
persons impacted by mass incarceration-inmates and third parties such
as families and communities -have neither statutory nor constitutional
rights to assert. Inmates may challenge the legality of their conviction,
sentence, and prison conditions."' Former inmates have few avenues to
challenge collateral consequences of their convictions, including
disenfranchisement, loss of benefits, stigma, diminished social status, and
unemployment.'
Mass incarceration is also different from routine criminal claims
because it significantly affects third parties. Third parties, namely, the
children, spouses, and communities whose lives are deeply shaped and
transformed by incarceration, have no legal claim to redress those
harms."' And unlike defendants or victims, third parties harmed by mass
incarceration have no clear-cut role in the criminal adjudication system."'
A defendant's own children, who may not be victims of the crime but will

Id. at 393, 396.
Id. at 393 ("Repeat players, such as criminal courts, prosecutors and public defenders, can
achieve economies of scale without aggregation, by coordinating, channeling and settling cases, all in
the shadow of strict sentencing rules that routinize outcomes.").
123.

124.

125. Id. at 447.
126. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, ito Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified

as amended in scattered sections of 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter PLRA]. A prison official's
conduct violates the Eighth Amendment in the context of prison conditions when he has acted with
"'deliberate indifference' to inmate health or safety" by "posing a substantial risk of serious harm" to
the prisoner. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); see Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1946-47
(2011) (affirming an order pursuant to the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act requiring California to
reduce its prison population to remedy unconstitutional conditions in its correctional facilities). See
generally Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 1I6 HARv. L. REV. 1555, 1663 fig.IV.E (2003) (detailing
trends in inmate litigation before and after the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act).
127. Michael Pinard, Reflections and Perspectives on Reentry and Collateral Consequences, too J.
CRiM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1213, 1214, 1223-24 (2010). Cf Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010)
(illustrating the collateral consequences of deportation for the conviction of an immigrant defendant).
128. See Brown, supra note i19, at 1385 (defining third parties as those, other than the victim and
defendant, whose interests in criminal law are explicit, and describing the role of third-party interests
in charging and sentencing).
129. Id.
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be harmed directly and significantly by the defendant's incarceration,
may not appear in court or have any rights to assert. 3 o On a discretionary
basis, third-party interests are sometimes considered by the prosecutor in
charging or by a court in sentencing, but they are not part of routine
criminal adjudication, which focuses on the individual defendant's crime,
culpability, and rights.'3 '
The temporal reach of mass incarceration extends beyond the life of a
criminal case and prison sentence. Though many inmates may anticipate
that some civil disabilities flow from a felony conviction, at the time of
conviction they may not know or understand the full extent and lasting
impact of those civil sanctions.' For some family members, the primary
and immediate harm of a prison sentence is temporary, such as the
absence of parental care and support during a prison term, coupled with
the strain and expense of maintaining a relationship with the incarcerated
parent. Though the temporary harm ends with release, other harms persist
as a result of the stigma, diminished stability, and socioeconomic status
that result from a conviction and prison sentence, with lasting impacts on
the inmate, his children, family, and community.'
The "mismatch" is that our criminal justice system, which plays an
important role in producing prisoners and monitoring them after prison, 34
is not set up to remedy the systemic problem of mass incarceration.
Instead, our system provides limited remedies to individuals who face
criminal adjudication and have experienced constitutional violations.
While these remedies might bring relief to those criminal defendants with
the opportunity and means to raise meritorious claims, they are mostly
unhelpful to abating the harms of mass incarceration. This mismatch
between mass incarceration and our system of individualized adjudication
makes it difficult to know where mass incarceration concerns might fit into
judicial decisionmaking under existing or proposed legal doctrine. Judges'
involvement in every criminal case gives them a unique vantage point,
and criminal sentencing is one place where they traditionally
individualize case outcomes in light of broader systemic concerns.

130. See generally John Hagan, The Next Generation:Children of Prisoners,J. OKLA. CRIM. JUST. RES.

CONSORTIUM, available at http://www.doc.state.ok.us/offenders/ocjrc/96IThe%2oNext%2oGeneration.pdf
(last visited Dec. 7, 2012); Chesa Boudin, Comment, Children of Incarcerated Parents: The Child's
ConstitutionalRight to the Family Relationship, 1o J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 77 (2oli) (describing

the myriad impacts of parental incarceration on children).
131. Brown,supra note II9, at 1386-90.
132. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS
CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT (2oo).

ON

UNIF.

STATE

LAWS,

UNIFORM

COLLATERAL

133. See Western & Wildeman, supranote 38, at 230.
134. The budget for corrections is the fastest growing in the United States' budget, second only to
Medicaid. CHRISTINE S. Scorr-HAYWARD,

CTR.

ON SENTENCING & CORRECTIONS, THE FISCAL CRISIS IN

CORRECTIONs: RETHINKING POLICIES AND PRACTICEs 3 (2009). Further, over 5 million people in the

United States are on probation, parole, or correctional supervision. Id. at 7.
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JUDICIAL INTERVENTION

There are strong historical, political, and practical justifications for a
judicial response to mass incarceration. The salient facts about mass
incarceration hint at three possible judicial responses: one patterned on
systemic civil litigation, one patterned on criminal rights, and one
patterned on sentencing. The prospect of systemic civil litigation is
limited absent legislation authorizing a specific cause of action related to
mass incarceration. Because mass incarceration arises from the criminal
adjudication system, it makes sense to respond to mass incarceration
within the criminal adjudication process. But this approach returns us to
the mismatch described earlier, namely, that criminal adjudication is
focused on individual culpability and rights, not systemic wrongs. Reforms
at the charging, pretrial, or guilt phases of criminal adjudication could
ameliorate mass incarceration, but many would require a significant
departure from the courts' traditional role. Finally, thinking about mass
incarceration concerns after sentencing is too late. This Part examines
these alternatives before proposing that courts should consider mass
incarceration impacts at sentencing.
I.
Systemic Civil Litigation
Three kinds of civil suits-those focused on civil rights, prisoner
conditions, and indigent defense-come to mind as possible avenues for
redressing mass incarceration. None of these is ideal because each
involves complex litigation that is difficult to mount, and the specific
focus of each is not aimed at actually reducing mass incarceration or its
harms. As a result, these suits are likely to redress mass incarceration
only indirectly.
While many describe mass incarceration as a civil rights issue, the
promise of a civil rights response in the courts appears limited under
current law.' Professor Michelle Alexander argues that mass incarceration
is a system of racial control and legalized inequality, which, like Jim
Crow laws, is premised on racialized politics, legalized discrimination,
and political disenfranchisement for millions of black men.36 Professor
Alexander urges broad scale political and cultural reform to reverse mass
incarceration, not isolated victories in legislatures or courtrooms."'

135. MICHELLE

ALEXANDER,

THE

NEW

JIM

CROW:

MASS

INCARCERATION

IN THE

AGE

OF

COLORBLINDNESS 4, II (20o); see Bryan Stevenson, Exec. Dir., Equal Justice Initiative of Ala.,

Keynote Address at the DePaul Law Review Symposium: Race to Execution (Oct. 24, 2003), in
53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1699, 1703 (2004) (identifying slavery, reconstruction, Jim Crow, and mass

incarceration as the four defining experiences in African-American history); see also Deborah Ahrens,
Methademic: Drug Panic in an Age of Ambivalence, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 841, 858 (2010) (describing

the disparity between the sentencing guidelines for powder cocaine and crack cocaine).
136. ALEXANDER, supranote 135, at ii.

137. See id. at 4, 11.
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Entrenched policies and interests support high incarceration rates,'3' and
the prospect for broadscale political reform appears limited.' Absent
specific authorizing legislation, a civil rights strategy in the courts would
likely rely on the Equal Protection Clause to claim that criminal
enforcement policy or incarceration disproportionately impacts racial
minorities. 4 o Such claims are difficult to bring because they require proof
of racially discriminatory intent-that the state acted with the intent (not
merely the effect) of harming a racial group. 4 ' Many regard mass
incarceration as the unintended product of many laws, rather than a
single or coordinated racist scheme.'4 2 Beyond the problem of identifying
and then proving a claim under a civil rights theory, practical questions
await about who could bring a claim and what remedy would be
available.
Suits focused on inadequate prison conditions and indigent systems
offer another, albeit an indirect, opportunity to redress mass incarceration
through systemic litigation. In Brown v. Plata,the Supreme Court affirmed
the district court's order under the Prison Litigation Reform Act requiring
California to reduce its prison population in order to remedy
unconstitutional conditions in its correctional facilities. 43 The focus of this
138. See MARC MAUER, THE RACE TO INCARCERATE IO-II (2006) (estimating that over 6oo,ooo
persons work in prisons as guards, administrators, and service workers); see also ALEXANDER, supra
note 135, at 218 (arguing that the criminal justice bureaucracy-i.e., police, judicial, and legal services
required to process criminals-provides some 2.4 million jobs).
139. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 CoLum. L. REV.
1276, 1282 (2005) (describing how prisoners and their families "currently do not have a strong voice in
the political process," especially when they are pitted against powerful "tough on crime" and proprison interest groups); William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1973-74 (2oo8)
(arguing that racially disproportionate imprisonment rates stem from the decline in locally selfgoverning justice systems in high-crime cities). However, political support for lower sentences exists.
See Fair Sentencing Act of 200, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 2, 124 Stat. 2372 (2olo) (eliminating the
mandatory minimum sentence for possession of crack and reducing the crack-cocaine disparity under
statutory sentencing laws from ioo:I to t8:t). Reductions in prisoner numbers are commonly
prompted by fiscal or liability concerns and have marginal or mixed impacts on incarceration rates
overall. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1944 (2011) (ordering reduction in prisons due to
unconstitutional conditions); Clear & Austin, supra note 18, at 3o8.
140. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 8o6, 813 (1996) ("[T]he constitutional basis for objecting
to intentionally discriminatory application of the laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth
Amendment. Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment
analysis."). To prove selective prosecution based on race, a defendant must present clear evidence to
dispel the presumption that the prosecutor has not violated the Equal Protection Clause. See United
States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (noting that courts presume prosecutors properly
perform their official duties).
141. Braman, supra note 117, at 2122.
142. See id. at 2o98, 2121-23 (describing the failure of equal protection theory to redress harms of
mass incarceration on inmates and their families). Braman observes that Equal Protection claims
involve detailed factual analysis and that courts uniformly rejected such challenges to the federal 1ooto-I crack-cocaine disparity. Id. at 2098; see also United States v. Moore, 54 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 1995)

("Every circuit court that has addressed this issue has held that there is no evidence of a racially
discriminatory purpose behind the ratio.").
143. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1937-45 (affirming an order to release prisoners due to unconstitutional
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complex and lengthy litigation was inadequate prison conditions due to
overcrowding, not specifically mass incarceration. Still, the case
highlights the capacity of courts, aided by experts and special masters, to
examine the prison system in detail and conclude that releasing prisoners
would not adversely impact public safety.'" Systemic litigation
challenging the adequacy of indigent defense services shares some
similar features in that it is difficult to mount successfully and any relief
would redress mass incarceration harms only indirectly.145
Intervention in a CriminalCase
Responding to mass incarceration within a criminal case seems like
a logical choice because the defendant is already in court, involved in a
case that will likely determine his future. Before and during trial, the
court's role is to protect the defendant's constitutional and statutory
rights.46 The criminal rights revolution of the 196os transformed
adjudication by recognizing and protecting individual constitutional
rights.147 These protections reflected systemic concerns about poor
defendants, especially blacks, who, without counsel, were convicted after
warrantless searches and seizures, incommunicado detention, and coercive
interrogation.'4' Though these constitutional protections reflect systemic
concerns, rights-based criminal litigation is highly individualized, casespecific, and offers few opportunities to consider systemic concerns like
mass incarceration, which is not tethered to a constitutional right. 49 The
criminal rights revolution had little impact on sentencing, a phase when
2.

conditions caused by overcrowding).
144. Id. at 1941-44.

145. See, e.g., Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 427, 444-48 (2009) (describing the proliferation of lawsuits alleging that
indigent defense providers systematically violate the Sixth Amendment).
146. See STrrH & CABRANES, supra note 37, at 28.
147. JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: How THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 83-84 (2007); cf Stuntz, supra note 139, at 1973.
148. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (holding that a warrantless search
incident to arrest is limited to the arrestee's person and reach area); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
444-45 (1966) (requiring officers to give wamings before custodial interrogation, including the rights
to remain silent, consult attorney, and counsel appointed); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961)
(applying the exclusionary rule for Fourth Amendment violation to states); Spano v. New York, 360
U.S. 315, 324 (1959) (invalidating a conviction based on the defendant's coerced confession).
149. Some argue that the expansion of criminal rights caused a backlash against judges and their
discretion. See Naomi Murakawa, The Racial Antecedent to Federal Sentencing Guidelines: How
CongressJudged the Judges from Brown to Booker, I i ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 473, 479-80 (2006)
(linking backlash to support for the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984); Justice John Paul Stevens, On
the Death Sentence, THE NEW YORK TIMES REVIEW OF BOOKS (2010) (reviewing DAVID GARLAND,
PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY IN AN AGE OF ABOLITION (2010))

(describing

backlash to the liberal Warren Court decisions protecting the rights of criminal defendants and
minority voters). Critics also argue that the criminal rights approach failed to protect local
communities affected by crime. See Braman, supranote II7, at 2097.
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courts consider individual and systemic factors.'o As a practical and
theoretical matter, the only real opportunity to incorporate mass
incarceration considerations is at sentencing. Before sentencing is usually
too early, and after sentencing is too late.
a. Before Sentencing, Courts Mainly ProtectIndividual
Rights
In the early stages of criminal adjudication it may be premature for
courts to assess mass incarceration, and doing so would diverge from the
court's traditional oversight function of ensuring that defendants have
their day in court, are guaranteed their constitutional rights, and
understand the process.'"' Before sentencing, the most powerful person
in a criminal case is not the judge, but the prosecutor, who determines
whether to charge, what charges to bring, what plea deals to offer, and
what sentence to recommend."' The court's role is primarily limited to
screening charges,' apprising defendants of their rights,"' reviewing pretrial motions,"' and determining who should be detained pending trial."'
The main event is adjudication of guilt by plea or at trial, neither of which
provides an opportunity to redress mass incarceration impacts. Courts are
essential to the plea hearing,' but often play a perfunctory role as all
ISO. See STrrT & CABRANES, supra note 37, at 27-37; Carissa B. Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick,
Recognizing Constitutional Rights at Sentencing, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 47, 56-74 (201I) (identifying aspects
of sentencing where constitutional protections are inapplicable).
151. As others have suggested, many opportunities for reform exist before and outside the criminal
adjudication process, including indirect efforts to reduce criminal behavior, changes in policing
practices, and changes in prosecutorial decisions. See Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming
Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1153-54 (1998) (describing changes in urban policing
practices); Sampson & Loeffler, supra note 15, at 25 (linking decreased crime and incarceration rates
in areas with urban redevelopment); Kevin K. Washburn, Restoring the Grand Jury, 76 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2333, 2380-8I (2oo8) (discussing the benefits of the neighborhood grand jury or grand jury by zip
code).
152. See ANGELA J. DAVIs, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 15 (2oo7)
(arguing that prosecutors have escaped the kind of scrutiny and accountability demanded of other
institutional entities); Miller, supra note 35, at 1252 (stating that the federal sentencing guidelines preBooker gave "virtually absolute power" over federal prosecutions and sentencing to prosecutors); see
also Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (explaining why prosecutors are given such
broad discretion on whether to charge a defendant).
153. Absent indictment by grand jury, a court holds a preliminary hearing to determine whether
probable cause supports the charges. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.i(e).
154. Id. at 5(d)(i)(B).

155. Id. at 12(b) (requiring that certain motions be presented before trial, including those alleging
non-jurisdictional charging defects, to suppress evidence, to sever charges or defendants, and for
discovery).
156. See Riverside v. McLaughlin, Soo U.S. 44, 56 (1991) (stating that probable cause review
should be conducted within forty-eight hours of arrest); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125-26 (975)
(noting that state pretrial detention requires a timely judicial determination of probable cause before
or promptly after arrest); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a)(i)(A) (requiring a defendant to be brought
before a magistrate judge without unnecessary delay after arrest).
157. Cf Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence 72 OHIO Sr. L.J. 723, 725 n-5
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participants are invested in ensuring that the plea is accepted."' At trial,
courts act as referees to ensure that the trial is fair and the government has
met its burden of proof.'59
Systemic factors influencing mass incarceration are clearly present
during these stages of the criminal process, but incorporating concerns
about mass incarceration could create tension with the focus on guilt and
individual rights.'" The detention hearing is critical to the defendant in
ways that influence the later guilt and sentencing determinations, but it is
often informal, brief, and done when the court and defense counsel know
relatively little about the defendant or the crime.'"' Because the guilty plea
is often aimed at securing a particular sentence, through charge-bargaining
and prosecutor recommendations, greater judicial oversight during that
phase could enhance sentencing discretion and minimize some mass
incarceration harms.' Because the court's role before sentencing centers
on process and guilt adjudication, shifting that focus to the consequences
of conviction at this point in the process would represent a more
dramatic departure than doing so at sentencing.
b. After Sentencing, Courts Review Legal Error
Thinking about mass incarceration after sentencing is too late.
Criminal appeals and post-conviction procedures are of little practical
use to most defendants because most plead guilty' 63 and thus cannot
appeal, 6 4 lack a viable legal claim, or lack the time needed to pursue
(2011).

158. Only the court can accept a guilty plea, and it must be satisfied on the record that the
defendant's plea is voluntary, that his admissions and any proffered evidence satisfy the requisite
elements of the crime, and that the defendant understands the terms and consequences of his guilty
plea. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261-62 (1971).
159. See Garrett, supra note 99, at 397 (describing criminal trials as "island[s] of technicality in a
sea of discretion").
16o. Because some 30% of initial charges do not result in conviction, increased judicial attention
before sentencing may be inefficient. See COHEN & KYCKELHAHN, supra note 38, at I. Statistics show

that out of soo felony defendants, 8% of cases are resolved through diversion or other outcome, 23%
are dismissed, and 69% are prosecuted. Id. at I fig.i.
161. See Baradaran,supra note 157, at 725-26, 754. The high detention rates for non-violent and
low-level offenders raise concerns about fairness and influence case outcomes. See, e.g., Mosi Secret,
Low Bail, but Weeks in Jail Before Misdemeanor Trials, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 3, 20Io, at A27 (reporting
that many low level defendants lack the funds to post bail and are detained before trial).
162. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (suggesting judicial supervision during the
guilty plea colloquy could avoid prejudice due to ineffective assistance of counsel); Stephanos Bibas,
Plea BargainingOutside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARv. L. REv. 2464, 2474-75 (2004). See generally

Nancy J. King, Judicial Oversight of Negotiated Sentences in a World of Bargained Punishment,
58 STAN. L. REV. 293 (2005).

163. See 2008 FEDERAL JusTICE STATISTICs, supra note 31, at tbl.4.2 (finding that over 96% of felony
convicts pled guilty during the period from 2007-2008); Hessick & Hessick, supra note 150, at 56 n-43

(noting that in 2000, federal courts had a conviction by guilty plea rate of 95% or higher, and in 2002
the state conviction by guilty plea rate was 95%).
164. See King & O'Neill, supra note ino, at 212 (finding, based on a research sample, that

HeinOnline -- 64 Hastings L.J. 446 2012-2013

February 2013]

MASS INCARCERATION AT SENTENCING

447

those procedures."' Court involvement in these cases is restricted to
fixing prejudicial legal errors, and courts mostly affirm.'6 The statistics
on appeals and post-conviction actions confirm that few sentences are
modified after the sentencing phase. Because there is no legal protection
against mass incarceration or its harms, redressing this systemic concern
during error-review litigation is not feasible.
c.

Mass IncarcerationImpacts Can Be Consideredat
Sentencing
Sentencing affords the best opportunity for courts to redress mass
incarceration for practical and doctrinal reasons. Aside from trial,
sentencing is the phase of a criminal case when judges are most active
and engaged.' 67 Before sentencing, the prosecutor directs the case toward
conviction while the court ensures the process is fair.'6 But the duty to
impose a sentence falls on the court, which individualizes punishment
based on a range of individual and systemic factors. At sentencing the
court assesses the defendant as a person-based on his history, character,
background, and future prospects-and is free to consider any relevant
information in doing so.'69 Courts must also weigh systemic factors,
including public safety, just punishment, and respect for the law, in
tailoring the defendant's sentence.' Sentencing provides the opportunity
to consider mass incarceration impacts because it permits broad
development of information relevant to the defendant including the
long-term, third party, and systemic impact of his punishment. Though
many of these points apply to sentencing generally,"' the following
defendants waive appeal in nearly two-thirds of plea agreements nationwide).
165. The time needed to litigate a federal habeas action, roughly five to six years, far exceeds the
median sentence of about two years and the average sentence length of about four years. NANCY J. KING
ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT
COURTS 55, 56 tbl.13 (2007), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesi/nij/grants/219559.pdf (finding
that, on average, it takes federal habeas petitioners over five years to file a petition in federal court
and another year for the court's decision).

166. Michael Heise, Federal Criminal Appeals: A Brief Empirical Perspective, 93 MARQ. L. REV.
825, 829 tbl.I, 829-30 (2oo9) (finding that appellate courts affirm over 70% of sentences); see U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 2009 fig.M, http://www.ussc.gov/
DataandStatistics/Annual Reports andSourcebooks/2oo9/SBTOCo 9 .htm (last visited Dec. 7, 202)

(81,350 convictions, 8,774 appeals, and 82.9% of appeals affirmed in 2009).
167. Hessick & Hessick, supra note 15o, at 56 n.43 (noting that the conviction by guilty plea rate is
95% or higher in federal and state courts).
I68. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 37, at 81. The prosecutor's charging and plea choices as well as
her recommendations at sentencing may influence or even determine the available sentencing options.
See Miller, supra note 35, at 1252; see also DAVIS, supra note 152, at 5 ("Prosecutors are the most
powerful officials in the criminal justice system."). But this extension of prosecutorial power into
sentencing, while it might limit discretion, does not negate the fact that sentencing is the stage of
adjudication in which judicial discretion is greatest.
169. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2006).
170. See, e.g., id. § 3553(a)(2).
171. See, e.g., Marc Mauer, Sentencing Reform: Amid Mass Incarceration-GuardedOptimism,
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discussion focuses on federal sentencing, in which traditional sentencing
factors are embedded in a statutory scheme. It concludes by describing
how courts could consider mass incarceration impacts at sentencing by
leveraging their broad capacity to gather and consider information in the
sentencing process and reframing traditional sentencing factors,
including public safety and proportionality, to include mass incarceration
harms. Part III shows how those features might operate in a federal case
and proposes several reforms to better equip courts to do this analysis.
i.

At Sentencing, Courts May ConsiderAll Relevant
Information
Sentencing is a stage when information about mass incarceration
impacts can be shared and, more importantly, linked to sentencing
factors routinely applied by courts. The sentencing hearing is unique
from other court proceedings before and after it. It is more flexible and
less formal than other hearings, and fewer procedural protections
apply.' The sentencing hearing is a face-to-face encounter between the
court and the defendant in a relatively non-adversarial setting in which
the goal is to assess punishment. Fewer rigid procedures leave courts
more free to consider any information that might be useful to
individualizing punishment based on the defendant's criminal behavior,
other conduct, character, and personal history.'73 The sentencing process
allows for the court to gather the broadest range of information about
the defendant before imposing sentencing.'74
Because courts can rely on a wide range of information at sentencing,
they can consider relevant information about mass incarceration harms
that might impact the defendant and others as a result of his sentence. The
Supreme Court recently reiterated in Pepper v. United States the
traditional sentencing principle that "the punishment should fit the
offender and not merely the crime, "..and it noted that the sentencing
court has "wide discretion in the sources and types of" information used to
determine the kind and extent of punishment.',6 Such information would
A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. MAG., no. I, Spring 20HI, at 27, 32 (stating that federal sentencing has placed
restrictive limitations on a judge's ability to consider personal characteristics of a defendant at
sentencing, while state sentencing systems generally afford judges greater sentencing discretion).
172. See SrrH & CABRANES, supra note 37, at 28-29 (noting that constitutional procedural
requirements during the adjudication phase do not apply at sentencing); Hessick & Hessick, supra
note 150, at 57-73, 92-94 (arguing constitutional protections should apply at sentencing).
173. See STTH & CABRANES, supra note 37, at 78.
174. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)-(d) (detailing information required in presentence report,
including guideline calculations of offense level and criminal history, factors relevant to appropriate
sentence, "defendant's history and characteristics," victim information, and non-prison resources
available to the defendant).
175. Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1240 (2011) (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S.
241, 247 (949))176. Id. (quoting Williams, 337 U.S. at 246).

HeinOnline -- 64 Hastings L.J. 448 2012-2013

February

2013]

MASS INCARCERATION AT SENTENCING

449

include the "fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life
and characteristics.""' The Court stated in Pepper: "No limitation shall
be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and
conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United
States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an
appropriate sentence.""' This "largely unlimited" inquiry appears to
permit courts to consider information about mass incarceration that is
relevant to the defendant's background and the court's task of imposing
an "appropriate sentence."' 79
ii. Judicial Discretionat Sentencing
The discretion courts exercise at sentencing situates them to consider
mass incarceration impacts on a case-by-case basis, as they blend systemic
and policy concerns into this highly individualized determination. Since
courts already consider systemic and policy concerns at sentencing,
considering mass incarceration impacts is simply adding new information
to a traditional analysis of sentencing purposes and concerns, including
respect for the law, deterrence, public safety, and proportionality.
Today courts exercise broad discretion at sentencing and are
uniquely situated to assess mass incarceration harms. In the over 70% of
federal cases in which a statute does not impose a minimum sentence,
this discretion is unbounded on the low end.'8 Federal courts are
required to consider a range of sentencing purposes that reflect both
individual and systemic concerns and must impose a sentence that "fit[s]
the offender and not merely the crime,"' 8 ' and which is "sufficient, but
not greater than necessary" to serve those various purposes.'"' Not only
do district courts possess sentencing expertise, they are local, and thus
may repeatedly sentence defendants from the same communities within
their districts. This proximity, coupled with courts' information-gathering
capacity, can support the meaningful consideration of mass incarceration
harms at sentencing.
The sentencing discretion courts enjoy today is broad, but not
boundless. Before the wave of sentencing reforms in the 1980s, the
sentencing judge had virtually unfettered discretion to impose a sentence
177. Id. (quoting Williams, 337 U.S. at 247).
178. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1970)).
179. Id. (citations omitted). The Sentencing Commission incorporated the statute's language into
the sentencing guidelines. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2oo6) with U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § IBI.4 (20Io). The only firm limitations on the court's discretion to consider information are
those imposed by constitutional constraints, so a court cannot consider the defendant's race, nationality,
or gender. Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1240 n.8; Carissa Byrne Hessick, Race and Gender as Explicit Sentencing
Factors,14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 127, 127 (2010).

18o. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2oo6); MANDATORY MINIMUM, supra note 2, at s.
181. Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1240 (quoting Williams, 337 U.S. at 247).
182. I8 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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within the statutory maximum set by the legislature.3 Courts exercised
this discretion "virtually free of substantive control or guidance."'84
Congress rarely specified a minimum term,"' and judges could decide
whether to send a defendant to prison at all and, if so, for how long.'8
This left sentencing policy in the hands of judges in individual cases,58
and their decisions generally were not reviewable on appeal."
Federal sentencing reforms beginning in the 198os significantly
constrained judicial discretion at sentencing. Most significantly, the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 created the Federal Sentencing
Commission and authorized it to create sentencing guidelines. The
Guidelines established sentencing ranges based primarily on the type of
offense and the defendant's criminal history.'" The Guidelines contained
a technically complex set of rules that ascribed points based on offense
level, with various aggravating and mitigating adjustments based on the
defendant's conduct.'" Points were also assigned to the defendant's
criminal history. The applicable sentencing range can be located on the
sentencing table, which contains a criminal history axis along the top and
offense level along the side."' Before 2005, courts were required to apply
the Guidelines,'9 2 and their sentencing decisions could be appealed. 93
Downward departures from the Guidelines ranges were relatively rare:
The Guidelines discouraged them except in extraordinary cases, the
reasons for departure had to be justified on the record, and departures
were scrutinized on appeal.'94 This rigid scheme constrained judicial

183. See Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 443 n.16 (1981) ("Sentencing and parole release
decisions in this country have largely been left to the unfettered discretion of the officials involved.
Legislatures have traditionally set high maximum penalties within which judges must choose specific
sentences, but generally have provided little guidance for the exercise of this choice.... In effect,
sentencing policymaking has traditionally been delegated to a multitude of independent judges to be
exercised in the context of individual cases." (quoting Peter B. Hoffman & Michael A. Stover, Reform
in the Determination of Prison Terms: Equity, Determinacy, and the Parole Release Function,
7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 89,96 (1978) (footnotes omitted))).
184. Id. at 444 (quoting Sanford H. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and
Sentencing Processes,75 HARv. L. REV. 904, 916 (1962)).
185. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 37, at 20. Further, parole boards decided whether to release a
defendant short of the full term. Id.
186. Id.
187. Bullington, 451 U.S. at 443 n.I6.

188. Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing Decisions,
6o ALA. L. REV. I, 4 (2oo8) ("For the greater part of American history, appellate review of federal
criminal sentences was non-existent in most cases.").
189. See 18 U.S.C. H§3551-53 (2oo6).
190. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 179, § iBi.i.
191. See id. at 393.
192. See 18 U.S.C. § 3 5 53 (b), see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 234 (2005) (observing
that the statute required courts to impose a sentence within the applicable guidelines range).
193. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a); see also Booker, 543 U.S. at 233.
194. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. io8-21, § 40, 117 Stat. 650, 667-75 (2oo3).
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discretion at sentencing, as courts faithfully applied the mandatory
Guidelines.
Congress also enacted mandatory minimum sentences for a range of
offenses, which curtailed judicial discretion to impose lower sentences.
Mandatory minimums most significantly impacted punishments for drug
trafficking offenses.'" In 2oo8, approximately 28% of all federal
defendants were convicted under a mandatory minimum statute.'" Since
courts may impose sentences without regard to the mandatory minimum
on narrow statutory grounds, not all of these defendants actually receive
the mandatory minimum sentence.' Hence, despite mandatory minimum
statutes, courts enjoy low-end sentencing discretion in the vast majority
of cases.
Judicial discretion was significantly restored in 2005 when the
Supreme Court's seminal decision in Booker v. United States made the
Guidelines advisory. ' The Court in Booker held that treating the
Guidelines as mandatory violated the Sixth Amendment because they
permitted judge-made findings to support a sentencing increase and
violated a criminal defendant's right to a jury trial and proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of each and every element of the crime.'99 As a remedy,
the Court in Booker invalidated two provisions of the Sentencing
Reform Act and instructed the district courts to treat the Guidelines as
"effectively advisory."" Under Booker, district courts must impose a
sentence based on a set of statutory factors contained in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a), and appellate review of the sentence is for "reasonableness"
under an abuse of discretion standard.20'

195. See MANDATORY MINIMUM, supra note 2, at 9-to (finding that, in 2008, 82.5% of persons

convicted under a mandatory minimum statute were convicted of drug offenses). Among these was the
controversial ioo-to-i crack-cocaine disparity contained in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which
imposed harsh mandatory minimum sentences for distribution of crack: five years for five grams, ten
years for fifty grams. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2oo6). This disparity was decreased in 20Io. Fair Sentencing
Act Of 2o1o, Pub. L. No. 11-220, § 2, 124 Stat. 2372 (2olo) (reducing the crack-cocaine disparity from
loo:I to 18:r, so that 28 grams (not 5 grams) triggers a five-year minimum prison term and 280 grams
(not 5o grams) triggers a ten-year minimum prison term) The Act eliminated a mandatory minimum
prison term for simple possession of less than 5 grams of crack cocaine. Id. § 3.
196. See MANDATORY MINIMUM,

supra note 2, at I (finding that, in 2oo8, the Sentencing

Commission identified 171 individual mandatory minimum provisions and, out of a total group of
73,497 cases, in 21,023 cases (28.6%) the person was convicted under a mandatory minimum statute).
197. See id. at io (finding that, in 2oo8, 55.9% of drug offenders convicted under a statute carrying
a mandatory minimum were eligible to be sentenced without regard to and below the mandatory
minimum based on substantial assistance to the government under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), or under the
"safety valve," § 3553(f), which applies to the least culpable drug offenders).
198.
199.
2oo.
2o.

Booker, 543 U.S. at 259-60.
Id. at 244.
Id. at 245 (invalidating i8 U.S.C. H§3 55 3 (b)(i) and 3742(e)).
See Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1241 (2011).
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After Booker, federal sentencing is essentially a hybrid system in
which the Guidelines supply only part of the analysis.o The Guidelines
still figure prominently: They must be given "respectful consideration,""
but they are neither binding nor presumed to be correct." The court's
first step in sentencing is to correctly calculate the applicable Guidelines,
which provide the "starting point and initial benchmark."2 o" Once the
court determines the applicable Guidelines range, both parties have an
opportunity to argue for whatever sentence they deem appropriate before
the district court analyzes the § 3553(a) factors. The district court cannot
presume that a sentence within the Guidelines is reasonable. Rather, it
must make an individualized assessment based on the facts presented."
That decision is accorded deference on appeal."
In deciding how to apply the Guidelines at sentencing, courts
consider systemic policy concerns and the facts of the case. The Supreme
Court has held that sentencing courts are free to reject the applicable
Guidelines range as excessive, either in an individual case or
categorically, based on a policy disagreement." In Kimbrough and
Spears, for example, the Supreme Court affirmed that district courts may
reject categorically the loo-to-I crack-cocaine disparity in the Guidelines
on policy grounds, as lacking empirical support, failing to achieve
sentencing objectives, and fostering disrespect for the law.2"0 When a
district court rejects the Guidelines for failing to serve sentencing

202. See Gertner, supra note 28, at 261. "Hybrid" has also been used to describe the approach of
"limited retributivism" in which guidelines supply an upper and lower limit on sentencing severity and
other factors, including deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and "parsimony" (i.e., choosing the
least severe sentence) are used to tailor the sentence. See Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes,
58 STAN. L. REv. 67, 68 (2005).
203. Kimbrough v. Unites States, 552 U.S. 85, ior (2007).
204. Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683, 2699 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
205. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007). The Guidelines are seen to "secure nationwide

consistency," and are listed among the factors to be weighed at sentencing. Id.; see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(4)-(5) (2006).
206. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
207. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51 (explaining that the appellate court, under the abuse of discretion
standard, can presume that a Guidelines sentence is reasonable, but cannot presume that a nonGuidelines sentence is unreasonable).
208. Id.

209. See Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 265-66 (2009) (per curiam) (explaining that district
courts could reject crack-cocaine Guidelines categorically on policy grounds, even in a mine-run case,
without "individualized, case-specific reasons"); Gall, 552 U.S. at 46, 50-51 (requiring sufficient
justification for non-Guidelines sentence based on facts presented in a particular case).
210. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 92, 95 (2o07) (explaining that the drug statute
uses the weight of the drugs involved as the sole proxy to identify major and serious dealers); see also
Spears, 555 U.S. at 265-66 ("[W]e now clarify that district courts are entitled to reject and vary
categorically from the crack-cocaine Guidelines based on a policy disagreement with those
Guidelines."); Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at log-io (explaining how drug Guidelines were based on statute,
not "empirical data and national experience").
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purposes, it is assessing systemic policy concerns through the lens of
individual sentencing determinations."'
Courts also may reject the Guidelines as applied to an individual
defendant because they fail to serve sentencing goals.212 In Gall v. United
States, the defendant was a twenty-one-year-old college student when he
participated in a drug distribution conspiracy for several months,
withdrew from the conspiracy on his own, was indicted several years
later, and pleaded guilty.213 In sentencing the defendant to a three-year
term of probation, the sentencing court rejected the Guidelinesrecommended prison sentence of thirty months to thirty-seven months,
noting that such a punishment would be "counter effective" because the
defendant was neither likely to re-offend nor pose a danger to society."'
The Supreme Court affirmed but required that a non-Guidelines sentence
like Gall's must be reasonable and supported by a sufficient justification
that is proportional to the degree of the variance."'
Under this modern system of regulated sentencing discretion, courts
consider systemic and individualized factors when imposing a sentence,
may be required to justify their sentences, and have considerable latitude
to reject a sentence that either will not serve sentencing goals or is too
severe.
iii. Courts Can Individualize Sentences Based on
Systemic Factors
Courts are authorized and well suited to consider mass incarceration
impacts at sentencing under § 3553(a), which provides a framework for
individualizing sentencing in light of systemic concerns. The overarching
command of § 3553(a) is that a court "shall impose a sentence sufficient,
but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes" of
punishment described in the statute.216 By its terms, the "parsimony
clause" requires a court to select the least restrictive sentence that satisfies
the sentencing purposes.' The parsimony clause also could be understood
more broadly to avoid unnecessary harms to the defendant and
secondary harms to his family and community."' Under either reading,
211. See Gertner,supra note 28, at 272 (referring to the court's rejection of the crack-cocaine ratio
in Kimbrough on policy grounds as a "categorical challenge" and its reliance on individualized
characteristics as an "as-applied approach"); Carissa B. Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing Policy
After Kimbrough, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 717,726,731-32 (2010).
212. Gall, 552 U.S. at 53-56 (2007).
213. Id. at 42-43.
214. Id. at 44-45.
215. Id. at 5o (suggesting that a major departure requires more justification than a minor one). The

district court's failure to properly calculate the applicable Guidelines may be reversible error. See id.
at 51.
216. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006).

217. See United States v. Samas, 561 F.3d lo8, n1o (2d Cir. 2009).
218. See Weisberg & Petersilia, supra note 13, at 124.

HeinOnline -- 64 Hastings L.J. 453 2012-2013

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

454

[Vol. 64:423

the parsimony clause invites courts to consider whether a specific
punishment is justified, and considering mass incarceration harms could
influence that calculus. As a practical matter, mass incarceration
considerations can be viewed as relevant to the defendant's history or
relevant to the purposes of sentencing.
The sentencing statute requires courts to consider a range of factors
in light of the four sentencing purposes: retribution, deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation.2 19 These sentencing factors reflect the
tradition of individualizing punishment to fit the offender22 o by considering
"the nature of and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant,'.. the Guidelines,222 and the kinds of
sentences available.2 " This necessarily involves some comparative analysis
in considering the "need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
conduct."224
Importantly, these § 3553 factors must be considered in light of four
sentencing purposes that correlate to the four traditional purposes of
punishment: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.
The first purpose embodies the concept of retribution: "to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide
just punishment for the offense.",22' The second purpose reflects deterrence
of criminal conduct.227 The third purpose refers to incapacitation, namely,
"to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant."" The fourth
describes rehabilitation: "to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment in the most effective manner."22 9
Because the four purposes of sentencing incorporate systemic and
public values like public safety, justice, and respect for the law, they
provide an opportunity to consider mass incarceration impacts that touch
219. See i8 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(I).().
220. Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229,

1240

(2011) ("[T]he punishment should fit the

offender and not merely the crime." (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (949))).
221. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(I).

222. See id. § 3553(a)(4) (considering "the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established
for .... the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set
forth in the guidelines"); id. § 3553(a)(5) (considering "any pertinent policy statement" by the
Sentencing Commission "subject to any amendments made to such policy statement by act of
Congress" at the time of sentencing).
223. See id. § 3553(a)(3) (considering "the kinds of sentences available"); id. § 3553(a)(7)
(considering the "need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense").
224. Id. § 3553(a)(6).
225. See id. § 3553(a)(2); United States v. Tapia, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2387 (2oll) (describing four
purposes of sentencing: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation).
226. I8 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A).
227. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(B) ("to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct").
228. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(C).
229. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(D).
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on those common concerns. Societal values at stake in sentencing-"just
punishment," "respect for the law," and "deterrence"-serve as a
reminder that sentencing is not just about the individual defendant, but is
also a public judgment intended to send a message to the defendant and
others. Though retribution focuses on culpability and "respect for the
law," and is often aligned with tough-on-crime rhetoric, these concepts
also speak to the need for legitimacy and concern for public confidence
in the criminal justice system. The Supreme Court in Gall acknowledged
that overly harsh punishment might diminish respect for the law.23 o
Arbitrary, discriminatory, or harsh punishments may erode the public's
confidence that the system is fair and just.
Public safety is also a core goal of sentencing and a special concern of
mass incarceration, since evidence suggests that high incarceration rates do
not necessarily yield public safety benefits."' The goals of incapacitation,
deterrence, and rehabilitation reflect a societal expectation that the
criminal justice system will improve (not endanger) public safety.
Incapacitation does so by preventing a defendant from reoffending during
his incarceration." Deterrence theory relies on the notion that the
punishment meted out to an individual defendant will dissuade both him
and others from committing such crimes in the future."' And
rehabilitation, though directed at treating an individual defendant, reflects
the societal goal that a punishment should result in the defendant being
less (not more) likely to reoffend."
Incapacitation through imprisonment is widely accepted as a valid
sentencing purpose intended to improve public safety. The Supreme
Court in Ewing v. Californiarecognized that states have a valid public
safety interest in incapacitating repeat offenders."' But the Court also
acknowledged in Brown v. Plata that the imprisonment of offenders does
not necessarily benefit public safety.,36 In Brown, the Court relied on lower
23o. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 54 (2007) (quoting the district court, which sentenced the
defendant to a term of probation for a drug offense: "[A] sentence of imprisonment may work to
promote not respect, but derision, of the law if the law is viewed as merely a means to dispense harsh
punishment without taking into account the real conduct and circumstances involved in sentencing.").
231. See Sampson & Loeffler, supra note 15, at 21-22.
232. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. I1, 24 (2003); see Frase,supra note 202, at 70.
233. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,320 (2002) ("The theory of deterrence in capital sentencing is
predicated upon the notion that the increased severity of the punishment will inhibit criminal actors
from carrying out murderous conduct."); Frase, supra note 202, at 71 ("General deterrence seeks to
discourage would-be offenders from committing further crimes by instilling a fear of receiving the
penalty given to this offender.").
234. Frase, supra note 202, at 70 (explaining that rehabilitation "seeks to reduce the offender's
future criminality" through education and treatment).
235. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 25 (observing that the California Legislature, in enacting the three strikes
law, "made a judgment that protecting the public safety requires incapacitating criminals," and that
"[sitates have a valid interest in deterring and segregating habitual criminals").
236. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1954 (2010). In Brown, the lower court was required under

the Prison Litigation Reform Act to "give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety"
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court findings that prison overcrowding would "perpetuate a criminogenic
prison system that itself threatens public safety," while shorter prison stays
and non-prison community correctional programs would have beneficial
effects on public safety.237 Though rehabilitation is one of the purposes in
§ 3553(a), the Supreme Court has recognized that imprisonment "is not
appropriate to promote rehabilitation. "8 Public safety is a systemic
concern connected to mass incarceration that might cause judges to opt for
non-prison or shorter prison sentences in some cases.
Sentencing permits what is otherwise absent in our criminal
adjudication model, namely, linking the outcome of one case to a broader
systemic context. The connection can be made under § 3553(a) because it
authorizes courts to consider sentencing inputs and outcomes. The inputs
include the broad informational scope of sentencing, including any
information relevant to the defendant, and the societal purposes of
sentencing. Importantly, the statute also requires courts to consider
sentencing outcomes. The "parsimony clause" builds in a proportionality
requirement to avoid unnecessary punishment; comparative analysis may
help "avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities,"239 and the sentencing
purposes account for public concerns that the system is fair, just, and
promotes public safety. Looking at outcomes enables courts to
individualize punishment in light of these societal concerns. Courts can
connect mass incarceration to the narrative of one individual defendant
and assess the real impact of punishment on the life of that defendant, his
family, and his community.
The advantages of looking at mass incarceration through the lens of
an individual case are that district courts are local and have sentencing
expertise. Courts are experts in individualizing punishment at sentencing
because they do it frequently24 o and have special competence based on
caused by court-ordered relief. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(I)(A) (2oo6)). The district court in
Brown found "clear" evidence that prison overcrowding would "perpetuate a criminogenic prison
system that itself threatens public safety," "reject[ed] the testimony that inmates released early from
prison would commit additional new crimes," and found that "shortening the length of stay through
earned credits would give inmates incentives to participate in programming designed to lower
recidivism," that "slowing the flow of technical parole violators to prison, thereby substantially
reducing the churning of parolees, would by itself improve both the prison and parole systems, and
public safety," that "the diversion of offenders to community correctional programs has significant
beneficial effects on public safety," and that "additional rehabilitative programming would result in a
significant population reduction while improving public safety." Id. (citations omitted).
237. Id. See Mark A. R. Kleiman & Kelsey R. Hollander, Reducing Crime by Shrinking the Prison
Headcount, 9 OHo ST. J. Clum. L. 89, 97-102 (2011) (critiquing the effectiveness of community
corrections).
238. Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2388-89 (2011) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2oo6) and
stating that rehabilitation cannot be considered in determining whether to imprison an offender or the
length of term to give him).
239. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6)(D).
240. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 52 n.7 ("District judges sentence, on average, 117
defendants every year.").
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the "vantage point and day-to-day experience in criminal sentencing."241
Courts have an experiential basis to compare criminal conduct,
prosecutorial decisions, relative levels of culpability, and the personal
histories of (common and unique to) the many defendants whom they
have sentenced over the years. They also can gather information in order
to compare the defendant to others.
Sentencing is a highly local event.242 This is important because
understanding how mass incarceration is relevant to an individual
defendant is a highly localized inquiry. As Professor Kate Stith has
observed, pre-Booker sentencing features fostered national sentencing
uniformity and constrained judicial discretion at the local level."' Booker,
Stith observes, restored sentencing to local judges, whose sentencing
determinations are influenced by local prosecutors and defense counsel."*
Courts now must impose a reasonable sentence, which need not follow the
Guidelines, and their sentencing decisions are reviewed on appeal under
the deferential abuse of discretion standard."' Because high incarceration
rates are geographically concentrated and disproportionately affect
disadvantaged communities, information about those affected families and
communities is essential to understanding the harmful impacts of
sentencing the defendant. A fuller understanding of the individual within
this specific local context would enable courts to tailor punishment more
effectively and consistent with the commands of § 3553(a).
Courts need not resolve the complex aspects of mass incarceration in
order to consider its relevance to an individual defendant. The scholarly
literature on mass incarceration points to the complex relationship
between crime, disadvantage, incarceration, and recidivism.246 For a court,
the sentencing inquiry may focus somewhat more narrowly on who will be
harmed by this sentence, how those persons will be harmed, and how
those negative effects can be avoided or minimized. Such information
may assist courts in their specific task of tailoring a punishment that is
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to achieve the statutory
punishment objectives. This can be done by examining the harms that
may result from incarceration in light of the statutory punishment
objectives with the goals of avoiding unnecessary punishment and

241. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98 (1996).
242. Stith, supra note 35, at 1427, 1495 (acknowledging that the Booker court "restored discretion,
localized in judges and prosecutors" at the district court level.).
243. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005) (severing i8 U.S.C. § 3742(e), which
applied a de novo standard of appellate review to non-Guidelines sentences, as specified in the
PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401, 117 Stat. 65o, 670-74 (2oo3)); Stith, supra note 35, at 1427,
1495.

244. Stith, supra note 35, at 1495.
245. Gall,552 U.S. at 46-47.

246. See Sampson & Loeffler, supra note 15, at 21; Wacquant, supra note

15, at 78.
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"unwarranted sentence disparities,"247 and promoting justice, respect for
the law, public safety, and individual rehabilitation.

III. CONSIDERING MASS INCARCERATION

IMPACTS AT SENTENCING

Thinking about mass incarceration at sentencing will pose some
challenges for courts and advocates, even among those willing to consider
it and do the necessary work. Some of these challenges revisit the difficulty
of addressing a systemic concern in an individualized setting, and they
present doctrinal, informational, and rhetorical barriers to factoring in
mass incarceration concerns at sentencing. I offer three proposals to build
the court system's capacity to consider mass incarceration harms in federal
sentencing.
The first proposal seeks to change the manner in which the courts
consider the Guidelines when determining the sentence. Under current
law, the Guidelines bookend the sentencing analysis-they supply the
"starting point" for the § 3553(a) analysis and the benchmark for
evaluating sentences on appeal-and thus have a determinant effect on
the sentence whether adhered to or not. Instead, courts should justify a
sentence based on the § 3553(a) factors, considering the Guidelines
policies and sentencing range in the mix with the other factors, as the
statute directs. This approach is permissible under the statute, but would
require a change in judicial doctrine.8
The second proposal aims to enhance the information at hand
during sentencing to develop expertise about mass incarceration harms.
Information about local community conditions, the defendant's family,
and other defendants may not be readily available to courts. A family and
community impact statement is one possible vehicle to educate courts
about facts that may be relevant to sentencing under § 3553(a) but are not
usually considered under the Guidelines. Better access to information
about other defendants would aid courts in avoiding unwarranted
sentencing disparities and support the court's justification for the
sentence imposed.
Finally, the third proposal is directed to advocates, who must equip
themselves to tell the mass incarceration narrative and illuminate its
relevance case-by-case. Because courts are not accustomed to hearing
about mass incarceration at sentencing, this strategy would represent a
new approach and it could be risky to try it without knowing whether the
judge will exclude the analysis or be persuaded by it. In many cases,
telling the mass incarceration narrative could advance the overarching
goal of enhancing the sentencing inquiry by educating the court about

247. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).

248. See infra Part III.B.i.
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the lasting impact and significance of the sentence on the defendant and
others.
These proposals are usefully considered in the context of a federal
case example before their details are fleshed out below.
A.

A CASE STUDY
Consider a non-violent drug crime involving low-level street sales by
an unemployed man with a prior felony conviction. Myles Haynes was
arrested in 2oo6 for selling three to four grams of crack cocaine in a law
enforcement sweep at the Bromley-Heath Housing Development in
Boston's Jamaica Plain neighborhood that netted eighteen defendants.249
Bromley-Heath that year was reported to be one of Boston's five crime
"hotspots," collectively accounting for 25% of the city's fatal shootings
and 40% of its non-fatal shootings."o Haynes grew up in Bromley-Heath
and left as a young adult, but eventually returned there to live with
relatives during an extended period of unemployment."' The investigation
at the Bromley-Heath development focused on drug trafficking, gang
activity, violence, and other crimes.2' Though Haynes was not targeted in
the months-long investigation, he was arrested after he participated in
two sales to an undercover agent, charged with distributing crack cocaine
in a public housing project, and pleaded guilty.5
Haynes was a somewhat typical defendant. Haynes had a criminal
record and was unemployed at the time of his arrest.2 54 He faced serious
prison time (up to forty-one months) under the Guidelines, but avoided
the then-mandatory minimum five-year sentence because he sold less
than five grams of crack.' So, as in most state and federal cases, the court
could exercise broad discretion at sentencing."' While the investigation at
Bromley-Heath was aimed at combating gang warfare and violence,' drug
MYLES HAYNES,

249. United States v. Haynes, 557 F. Supp. 2d 200, 201-02 (D. Mass. 2oo8).

250. Id. at 206 (explaining that the government urged a Guidelines prison sentence because of the
environment Haynes fostered by trafficking drugs). See Government's Sentencing Memorandum at 67, United States v. Whigham (2010) (No. o6-lo328-NG), 200 WL 2285619 (describing the criminal
defendant's arrest, which arose from the same sting in which Haynes was caught).
251. Haynes, 557 F. Supp 2d at 203.
252. Id. at 202.

253. Id. at 20-02. Haynes was also charged with aiding and abetting the distribution of crack
cocaine. Id. (listing violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2006) (distributing controlled substances), 21
U.S.C. § 860(a) (distributing controlled substances within looo feet of a public housing facility), and 18
U.S.C. § 2 (aiding and abetting)).
254. Id. at 203.

255. At the time Haynes was convicted, distribution of five grams of crack yielded a five-year
mandatory minimum prison term. Id. at 206 n.II. But see MANDATORY MINIMUM, supra note 2 (noting

the 2oo increase in crack quantity triggering five-year mandatory minimum).
256. MANDATORY MINIMUM, supra note 2, at 5-6.
257. See John Ruch, FBI, Police Charge 23 in Drug Bust, JAMAICA PLAIN GAZETTE, Oct. 20, 2006

(listing the addresses of arrestees and noting that eleven of the defendants had been banned from the
development for trespassing).
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trafficking laws provided the primary law enforcement tool.2"5 All
defendants netted in the sweep were charged with drug trafficking
offenses.259 Penalties for dealing crack disproportionately impact
minorities,26 and penalties for selling drugs in close proximity to a
housing project likely impact dealers living in and around the project, as
was the case in the Bromley-Heath sweep. '
That Haynes had a compelling personal history was largely irrelevant
to determining the applicable Guidelines range. He had graduated high
school and left Bromle7-Heath to get more education, and he served
briefly in the military. 2 He was a committed father to his own two
children, aged fourteen and eight, and his younger son's teenage halfsiblings, aged thirteen and sixteen.,6' After serving a year-long sentence for
a violent felony conviction nearly a decade earlier, Haynes successfully
completed a five-year term of probation and had no arrests.264 He trained
as an emergency medical technician, but his licensing was stalled due to
his prior conviction.265 When he returned to Bromley-Heath, he stayed
with his brother and cousin who both had steady jobs.'6
Such positive aspects of Haynes' personal history are "not ordinarily
relevant" to the applicable Guidelines range, which was primarily based
on the drug amount and his criminal history.26' Haynes faced a Guidelines
range of thirty-three months to forty-one months, which was based on his
criminal history, the drug quantity he sold (three to four grams of crack
cocaine),'6 and the fact that he sold drugs near a housing project.269 The
range was then decreased for his having pleaded guilty. 270 Under the
Guidelines, individual characteristics, including age, education,

258. See id.
259. See id.
260. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 98 (2007).
261. See Ruch, supranote 257.

262. United States v. Haynes, 557 F. Supp. 2d 200, 202 (D. Mass. 2oo8).
263. See Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 29, at 5.
264. Haynes, 557 F. Supp. 2d at 203-04.
265. Id. at 204.

266. See Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 29, at 6.
§§ 5Hi.2, 5 Hi.5.
268. Haynes, 557 F. Supp. 2d at 205 (describing how the Guidelines rely on drug quantity as a
"proxy for culpability" even though the Guidelines do not explain how drug quantity is supposed to
measure the seriousness of an offense). See generally Carissa Byrne Hessick, Why Are Only Bad Acts
Good Sentencing Factors?, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1109 (2008) (describing how the Guidelines use bad acts as
aggravating sentencing factors, but fail to credit good acts as mitigating sentencing factors).
269. Haynes, 557 F. Supp. 2d at 201 (referring to 21 U.S.C. § 86o(a) (2oo6), which applies to drug
distribution within looo feet of a public housing facility).
270. Id. at 201 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 179, §§ 2DI.i(c)(io),
2D1.2(a), 3Ei.i(a)-(b)) (in order: drug table, two-level increase for drug distribution involving a
protected location, and up to a three-level reduction for pleading guilty). The district court reduced his
range to twenty-seven to thirty-three months because he was a minor participant in the crime. Id. at
205-o6 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 179, § 3BI.2).
267. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, Supra note 179,
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employment history, family ties and responsibilities, and community ties,"'
are only relevant in "exceptional cases," if "present in the case to a
substantial degree.""' There was no doubt that Haynes' incarceration
would bring hardship on his children and deny them financial and
emotional support during their childhood and teenage years. But such
impacts are ordinary, not exceptional, and thus would not be grounds for a
lower Guidelines range."3 Haynes' efforts to attain an education and
vocational skills would also not be counted under the Guidelines.274
The failure of the Guidelines to consider many individualized
factors means that a mass incarceration analysis, if done at all, gets
shifted to the court's analysis of the § 3553(a) factors. Mass incarceration
most acutely affects persons from disadvantaged communities, and the
defendants from those communities often share common factors of
disadvantage, including low education, joblessness, family instability, and
poverty."' These factors are important to identifying a defendant in the
context of the societal problem of mass incarceration. While these factors
are generally excluded from the Guidelines analysis, they can be
considered in individualizing the sentence under the § 3553(a) factors.
The question then becomes how courts will gather, analyze, and apply
this information. The following proposals address these concerns.
B.

GETTING COURTS TO CONSIDER MASS INCARCERATION IMPACTS

1.

Start with the § 3553 (a) Factors, Not the Guidelines

Mass incarceration concerns could potentially justify a non-prison or
shorter prison sentence if a court is willing to embrace its sentencing
discretion and apply traditional sentencing factors in light of mass
incarceration harms. One doctrinal barrier to this approach is that the
Guidelines, which tend to yield significant prison terms, form the
backdrop of the sentencing analysis under § 3553(a). This is because

271. 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) (2oo6) ("The Commission shall assure that the guidelines and policy
statements, in recommending a term of imprisonment or length of a term of imprisonment, reflect the
general inappropriateness of considering the education, vocational skills, employment record, family
ties and responsibilities, and community ties of the defendant.").
272. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 179, § 5HI.I introductory cmt.
273. See id. § 5Hi.6(B) cmt. I (stating that family ties and responsibilities will not support a
departure unless the defendant's sentence will cause a substantial, direct, and specific loss of
caretaking or financial support, which exceeds the harm ordinarily incident to incarceration, and the
defendant's support is irreplaceable to the defendant's family); see also Dan Markel, Jennifer M.
Collins & Ethan J. Leib, CriminalJustice and the Challengeof Family Ties, 2oo7 U. ILL. L. REV. I147,
1198 n.283 (2007) (suggesting that the harsh impacts of criminal laws on families could be redressed by
policy changes, for example in drug enforcement statutes and sentencing policies that do not turn on
family status). After Booker, courts have reviewed departures based on family ties for abuse of
discretion. See United States v. Menyweather, 447 F-3d 625, 633 (9th Cir. 2oo6).
274. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 179, § 5Hi.2,I. .
5
275. Sampson & Loeffler, supra note 15, at 21.
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under current case law, the Guidelines supply the starting and ending
point for sentencing analysis. Considering the Guidelines midstream in
the sentencing analysis, like other factors, would better ensure that
courts justify sentences under the statutory factors without giving undue
weight to the Guidelines.
The Guidelines, though advisory, continue to have a significant
effect on sentencing. The Supreme Court has instructed that the
Guidelines calculation is "the starting point and the initial benchmark"
for sentencing and precedes the 3553(a) analysis.2"' As the starting point,
the Guidelines may have an "anchoring" effect in the § 3553(a)
analysis. 27 As Judge Gertner has explained in the sentencing context,
"anchoring" is a mental strategy used to simplify complex tasks, in which
an initial starting value (i.e., the anchor, here the Guidelines range) may
predict the outcome (i.e., the final sentence) because that anchor value is
merely adjusted upward or downward to accommodate the particular
details of the case."' In other words, the Guidelines range fixes the point
against which discretion is exercised and measured. This anchoring
happens as a matter of doctrine under § 3553(a) because courts must
start with the Guidelines range and support a non-Guidelines sentence
with a "sufficient" justification that is proportional to the degree of any
deviation."' Because the Guidelines generally exclude individualized
factors, especially mitigating factors,'" which may be significant under
§ 3553(a), the Guidelines may skew toward harsher sentences than the
statutory analysis would support.
The Guidelines also function as an important endpoint in the
§ 3553(a) analysis for two reasons. Courts must justify a non-Guidelines
sentence to the extent of any deviation."' This is a confusing standard
because although the court must not presume the Guidelines range to be
reasonable, it must justify its § 3553(a) analysis in light of the Guidelines.
The Guidelines also create a safe harbor for courts on appeal: Though all
sentencing decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion, a Guidelines
sentence is "presumptively reasonable" and thus least likely to be reversed
276. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (stating that the Guidelines are seen to secure
nationwide consistency and are listed among the factors to be weighed at sentencing).
277. Gertner, supra note 28, at 270 (describing the role of the guidelines after Booker: "Judges
continued to use the numbers in the Guideline framework as a significant, even dispositive, point of
reference, illustrating the phenomenon known to cognitive researchers as anchoring.").
278. See J. Nancy Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence: American Judges and Sentencing,
4 OIo ST. J. CRIM. L. 523, 535 (2007); see also Birte Englich & Thomas Mussweiler. Sentencing Under
Uncertainty:Anchoring Effects in the Courtroom,31 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 1535, 1536 (2001).
279. Gall, 552 U.S. at 46, 50 (suggesting that a major departure requires more justification than a
minor one). The district court's failure to properly calculate the applicable Guidelines may be
reversible error. Id. at 51.
280. See Hessick, supra note 268, at i iog-io. But see Gertner, supranote 28, at 272-74 (finding the
new advisory mandate makes the guidelines more flexible, thereby allowing mitigation).
281. Gall, 552 U.S. at 46.
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on appeal."' Requiring courts to begin and end sentencing analysis with
the Guidelines calculations is a doctrinal barrier that may impede the
exercise of discretion under § 3553(a).
Courts should instead consider the Guidelines midstream in the
§ 3553(a) analysis, like other factors. This approach is not currently
allowed under the Supreme Court's decisions, but it is consistent with the
Court's statements that the Guidelines factors under § 3553(a) are not
elevated among the others,"' and would be consistent with that statute.
The statute requires courts to apply all the factors in light of the
overarching command of § 3553(a) to "impose a sentence sufficient, but
not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes" described in
§ 3553(a)(2). Consistent with sentencing tradition and the statutory text,
the starting point would be the nature and circumstances of the offense
and the history and characteristics of the defendant.4 Next, the court
would consider the sentencing purposes, including just punishment,
respect for the law, rehabilitation and deterrence,"' and the sentencing
alternatives.286 Differently ordering the § 3553(a) analysis would allow
courts to gauge under the statute the term and kind of sentence the
defendant should serve. The Guidelines would be on equal footing with
other factors and, appropriately, not pose a barrier to individualized
sentencing. The Guidelines could still operate as a check on the proposed
sentence, and may prompt a court to adjust its proposed sentence or
better justify it.
There is little risk that this proposal would lead to arbitrary or more
disparate sentencing, as some might argue..2" Federal judges impose
sentences below the Guidelines range in 40% of cases based on a range
of mitigating factors, but only lo% of defendants receive a nonGuidelines sentences based on analysis of § 3553(a) factors.' The goal of
the midstream approach is to assure that sentencing courts individualize
sentencing and faithfully implement § 3553(a). Because the Guidelines
weight certain factors and exclude others, they can mask important
individual differences in culpability, dangerousness, and capacity for
reform."9 Integrating mass incarceration considerations will allow courts
to know more about the defendant, see him in a broader context,
consider the harms the sentence will cause to the defendant and others,

282. Id. at 40 ("[T]he court of appeals may presume that the sentence is reasonable.").
283. Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1249 ("At root, amicus effectively invites us to
elevate two § 3553(a) factors above all others. We reject that invitation.").
284. See i8 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(i) (2oo6); Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1239-40.
285. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
286. See id. § 3553(a)(3).
287. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 49 (noting that the Guidelines are seen to "secure nationwide consistency").
288. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, PosT-KimbroughlGallPATA REPORT (2008).
289. Gall, 552 U.S. at 55-56.

HeinOnline -- 64 Hastings L.J. 463 2012-2013

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

464

[Vol. 64:423

and appropriately tailor a sentence to achieve the statutory objectives
and minimize those harms.
ProvidingInformationalSupportfor Mass Incarceration
Analysis
To gain expertise about the impact of mass incarceration on
localities and the relevance of those impacts on the defendant, courts will
need better and different information than they may currently have. This
information generally falls into three categories: (i) background
information about the defendant, his family, and his community;
(2) comparison information about other defendants with similar records
convicted of similar crimes; and (3) sentencing information, including
effective non-prison sentences. A family and community impact
statement would be one vehicle to fill this information gap at sentencing.
Better access to sentencing data would help courts compare similar
defendants and outcomes.
2.

a. Family and Community Information
Because a key feature of mass incarceration is its concentrated
impact on certain disadvantaged communities, courts will want to know
more about such communities locally. A judge's local experience may
make him or her familiar with certain neighborhoods that are poverty
stricken, are high in crime, or produce many defendants. Haynes is an
example in which law enforcement targeted a crime "hot spot," a gangand violence-ridden housing project that was also likely a mass
incarceration hot spot.2" Elsewhere, identifying a mass incarceration hot
spot may be more difficult and would be aided by better data on the
socioeconomic status of defendants and mapping of incarceration rates
locally.29 ' Even judges familiar with their local crime hot spots may not
know the geographic concentration of incarceration in those same areas
and its destabilizing effects on public safety and children."'
To gain accurate information about such communities, courts may be
aided by experts who map or describe community conditions (including
incarceration rates) locally, community members, and the defendant's
family." A family and community impact statement is one vehicle to fill
this gap. Patterned on the victim's impact statement, the idea is to inform
the court about persons who are not party to the criminal proceeding but

United States v. Haynes, 557 F. Supp. 2d 200, 206-o8 (D. Mass. 2008).
291. See generally Erica J. Hashimoto, Class Matters, 10 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 31 (2011)
290.

(explaining that no complete data have been collected on the economic status of defendants in state or
federal courts).
292. See Haynes, 557 F. Supp. 2d at 206-08.
293. Sampson & Loeffler, supra note 15, at 27.
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have a stake in the outcome.2 94 Alternatively, the court could allow family
and community representatives to speak at the sentencing. Prosecutors
might respond with a different view of how the defendant's punishment
will impact his family and community. Bringing the voices of the
community into the courtroom at sentencing would add a local
dimension to sentencing that is often absent. Since the children, families,
and communities do not have a right to speak at sentencing, these options
would create a way of inviting their participation at sentencing.
Though the impact of incarceration on children is regular, widespread,
and documented, these harms may not be routinely considered by courts
at sentencing.' It is well known that children of incarcerated parents have
greater risk of criminal involvement."' The harm to Haynes' children, as in
most cases, was direct and concrete: Haynes maintained meaningful
relationships with all of his children, especially his eight-year-old son, and
separation would strain those relationships and deprive the children of
valuable financial and emotional support. Haynes' incarceration would
put his children at risk for future incarceration.
The community harm from incarcerating one person is more diffuse.
Particularly in a community plagued by crime and other markers of
disadvantage, a court might consider whether the community will be better
served by a defendant's incarceration or release. Imprisoned criminals
cannot commit local crime from prison, nor can they be community
members that function "as parents, workers, consumers, or neighbors.""
Removing community members can "undermine a community's ability to
self-regulate and exercise informal social control over crime by further
disrupting the creation of social and familial bonds."', In Haynes, the
court concluded that Haynes's release likely would promote, not disrupt,
public safety and enable him to move on as a citizen and a parent."'

294. See, e.g., Federal Crime Victims' Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4) (2000) (providing the
right of a crime victim to be "reasonably heard" at sentencing); see also Douglas E. Beloof,
ConstitutionalImplications of Crime Victims as Participants,88 CORNELL L. REV. 282, 299-305 (2003)

(identifying state laws that permit victims to testify at sentencing).
295. See generally Sarah Abramowicz, Rethinking ParentalIncarceration, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 793
(201); Myrna S. Raeder, A Primer on Gender-Related Issues That Affect Female Offenders, CRIM.
JUST., Spring 2005, at 4; Boudin, supra note 130 (describing the myriad impacts of parental

incarceration on children).
296. Raeder, supra note 295, at 7 ("It is common knowledge that children of incarcerated parents
have greater risk of offending. A study in Sacramento County, California, found that of all children
arrested between the ages of nine and 12, 45 percent had an incarcerated parent.").
297. Haynes, 557 F. Supp. 2d at 207 n.12 (noting that in 2004, approximately 1.5 million children in
the United States had a parent in prison) (citing JEREMY TRAVIs, Bur THEY ALL COME BACK II9 (2oo)).
298. Id. See Clear,supra note 76, at 181.
299. Haynes, 557 F. Supp. 2d at 207-08 (prohibiting Haynes from returning to Bromley-Heath

during his six-year supervised release).
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b. ComparingDefendants
Though § 3553(a) requires courts to compare the defendant to
similarly situated defendants, gathering such information may be
difficult. The Guidelines provide one convenient method of comparison
but, as indicated, those calculations can mask important individualized
differences from case to case and make defendants convicted of similar
offenses look more similar than they really are.3 0 Collecting real
sentencing data locally is challenging due to the individualized handling
of cases in different courts, by different counsel, as well as the lack of
public access in many places about the reasons for sentences. Even in a
single drug sweep like the one that netted Haynes, cases were prosecuted
separately in different court rooms. This has practical consequences on
the ability of courts to gather information on other defendants for
sentencing purposes and outcomes."o' In the Bromley-Heath sweep,
eighteen defendants were prosecuted in federal court and five others were
prosecuted in state court where they faced lower maximum penalties.3 2 In
federal court, cases from the sweep were assigned to different judges, and
defendants were prosecuted singly or with co-defendants. 3
Collecting sentencing data even within a single courthouse may prove
elusive. The District of Massachusetts, where Haynes was sentenced, is
unusual in that after sentencing it makes public the "Statement of
Reasons," which contains data on how the court determined the sentence
under the Guidelines and the §3553(a) factors.3 4 Because the timing of
each case is different, these data may not be available at the time of
sentencing for some defendants.3 5 Elsewhere, secrecy about sentencing
tends to be the norm,3" and the separate prosecution of related cases can
retard information gathering.3"
c. Non-PrisonSentencing Options
No-prison or reduced prison terms will be more attractive options if
courts know they will be effective. Judge Gertner and Justice Wolff,
300. United States v. Garrison, 560 F. Supp. 2d 83, 84-85 (D. Mass. 2oo8).
301. See Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing DisparityAfter Booker: A First Look, 63 STAN. L.
REV. I, 21-22 (2010) (analyzing inter-judge sentencing disparities from 2001 to 2008, based on

sentencing data from the District of Massachusetts).
302. Haynes, 557 F. Supp. 2d at 204-05.
303. Id. at 2o4-o6, 207 n.io.
304. See Scott, supranote 301, at 21.
305. Haynes, 557 F. Supp. 2d at 20

(noting that one of Haynes's co-defendants had been
sentenced, but not the other).
3o6. See Scott, supra note 30, at 23 (acknowledging that the District of Massachusetts is an
exception to the prevailing policies of secrecy regarding sentencing).
307. See United States v. Garrison, 560 F. Supp. 2d 83. 83 (D. Mass. 2008) (stating that in another
drug trafficking sweep in the District of Massachusetts involving twenty-one federal defendants, the
defendant was the sole defendant named in the indictment, and in the part of the presentencing report
listing "related cases," the probation officer wrote "none.").
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among others, have called for the development of a "what works"
literature and data on sentencing.3" Advocates of evidence-based
sentencing seek sentences that actually impede future criminal behavior
by either selecting an appropriate prison stay, selecting a non-prison
sentence, or choosing some combination." Judge Gertner has called for
the Sentencing Commission to redirect itself to be the repository of such
information within the federal system.3"o
Telling the Mass IncarcerationNarrative
3.
Courts may develop expertise on mass incarceration, but they will
still rely on defense advocates to explain its relevance and propose
sentencing options case by case. The mass incarceration narrative may be
different than a typical sentencing strategy that focuses on individualized
culpability, responsibility, and remorse, with a plea for leniency. A mass
incarceration analysis allows a court to assess the defendant in a broader
context by connecting the dots among many cases within the system and
to the real world consequences of the sentencing for the defendants and
others.
Telling this mass incarceration narrative may be risky as advocates
test the waters on a new approach not knowing whether the court will
consider the information, allow related testimony, or be persuaded that it
should impact the sentencing decision. Gathering and presenting a mass
incarceration narrative will require work-namely, creating maps, finding
experts, witnesses, neighbors, and family members to explain how the
conviction, any incarceration, and collateral consequences will affect
them. Presenting this information could make for a longer sentencing
hearing, and would require a judge willing to entertain this analysis. But
this advocacy could yield favorable results and, over time, educate the
court about common issues of local concern and help it tailor a sentence
that minimizes mass incarceration harms to the defendant and others.
Evaluating a defendant in the context of mass incarceration can
alter the significance of certain common characteristics. For a person like
Haynes-unemployed, a convicted felon, living in the projects, and
involved in low-level drug dealing-situating his case in the mass
incarceration context turned those negative factors into part of a more
complex story. His felony conviction diminished his work prospects,
disrupted his family life, caused him to return to the projects to rely on

308. See J. Michael A. Wolff, Evidence-Based Judicial Discretion: Promoting Public Safety
Through State Sentencing Reform, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1389, 1412-15 (2oo8); see also Gertner, supra
note 28, at 275-79.

309. See Gertner, supra note 28, at 278-79; Wolff, supra note 308, at 1412-13 (arguing that
alternative courts and programs are effective in reducing recidivism).
310. See Gertner,supranote 28, at 262.
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relatives, and led to low morale and criminal behavior.3 1' Despite these
setbacks, Haynes remained a devoted father and tried to obtain
employment. By putting a human face on mass incarceration, Haynes
appeared as a father struggling to carve a meaningful life despite his
criminal record.I 2 The court was able to tailor a short sentence followed
by a jobs program, which was aimed at returning Haynes to a productive
life.3 13
Telling the mass incarceration narrative may empower advocates to
reframe the relevance of factors common to many defendants as part of a
larger story. In a broader, systemic context, markers of disadvantageunemployment, criminal history, low education, family instability, racial
or economic isolation-may signal that a defendant comes from an
environment affected by mass incarceration. The outcome of his
sentence is connected to the well-being and stability of his family and
community, as well as public safety in the short and longer terms. Courts
have the ability to consider these impacts in tailoring a sentence that fits
the defendant and minimizes other harms.
CONCLUSION

Courts can address the problem of mass incarceration on a case-bycase basis at sentencing with the goal of imposing just punishment and
minimizing the collateral impacts of incarceration on the defendant and
others. Mass incarceration is a complex societal problem arising from
both the cumulative impact of many individual criminal cases and the
lasting impacts of incarceration on the defendant and his family, children,
and community. Sentencing is the best opportunity for courts to address
mass incarceration concerns because it allows courts to individualize
punishment in light of broad systemic concerns, which federal courts
must do under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Adding mass incarceration impacts to
the sentencing analysis would enhance the court's understanding of the
defendant and the real world consequences of his punishment, encourage
respect for the law, reduce unnecessary incarceration, and minimize its
harms, especially in those communities debilitated by incarceration.
Although the systemic problem of mass incarceration may ultimately be
redressed only through systemic reform, courts do not have to wait. They
can and should address mass incarceration at sentencing under existing
legal frameworks with minimal changes to legal doctrine.

311. United States v. Haynes, 557 F. Supp. 2d 2oo, 202-04 (D. Mass. 2oo8).
312. Id. at 205-o6.
313. Id. at 2o7-o8 (sentencing Haynes to thirteen months in prison and six years' supervised

release, requiring him to participate in a jobs program, and forbidding him from returning to BromleyHeath without permission).
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